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Development and justice through transformation
2015 saw a historic double success for sustainability and climate policy. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the Paris Agreement on climate 
 protection establish a system of ambitious policy goals for the world. The group of twenty major 
 industrialized and emerging economies (G20) now needs to resolutely advance implementation of both 
agreements, seizing the opportunity of this ‘Great Transformation’ to sustainability as a unique 
 modernization project that could offer substantial economic development opportunities. Complete 
 decarbonization of the world economy by 2070 at the latest can only be achieved by profoundly 
 transforming energy systems and other high-emissions infrastructures. This transformation could inspire 
 Innovation and channel Investment into sustainability and climate protection, and into the kinds of 
 sustainable Infrastructures that need to be  established and expanded. At the same time, the transformation 
could combat inequality and promote  Inclusion within societies and globally, thus becoming an equity 
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1Summary
2015 saw a historic double success for sustainability and climate policy. The 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
and the Paris Agreement on climate protection establish a system of ambitious policy 
goals for the world. The group of twenty major industrialized and emerging economies 
(G20) now needs to resolutely advance implementation of both agreements, seizing 
the opportunity of this ‘Great Transformation’ to sustainability as a unique moderni-
zation	project	that	offers	substantial	economic	development	opportunities.	Complete	
decarbonization of the world economy by 2070 at the latest can only be achieved by 
profoundly transforming energy systems and other high-emissions infrastructures. This 
transformation could inspire Innovation and channel Investment into sustainability and 
climate protection, e.g. into sustainable Infrastructures that need to be established and 
expanded. At the same time, the transformation could combat inequality and promote 
Inclusion within societies and globally, thus becoming an equity project. The G20, as a 
central	global	actor,	should	specifically	promote	the	Four	Big	‘I’s	of	sustainability	and	
climate	policy	to	ensure	that	conflicts	over	resources	and	their	distribution	are	defused	
and international crises avoided. Sustainable development, and in particular global 
climate protection, is currently the only ambitious undertaking that involves all the 
world’s nations and resulted in a global consensus. Achievements in this enormous, 
complex	policy	field	enable	countries	to	establish	mutual	trust,	making	the	‘Great	
Transformation’ to sustainability also a peace project. Germany’s G20 presidency can 
set a decisive course for this future programme.
A double breakthrough: the political context
In 2015 two global conferences reached a double break-
through. (1) The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment, with its 17 SDGs agreed upon at the UN in New 
York, outlines the complex challenges of a transforma-
tion towards sustainability that should also help over-
come global poverty. The SDGs are at once shared goals 
and a challenging programme of action for the global 
community. (2) The Paris Agreement under the auspices 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
( UNFCCC) for the first time establishes legally binding 
goals to keep man-made global warming well below 2°C 
and pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. These goals 
are an appropriate global political reaction to threats that 
can no longer be denied. 
However, our current political context is also 
 characterized by various dangerous tensions: wars and 
civil wars, mass migration and terrorism, global finan-
cial market crises and growing inequality as well as the 
rise of an authoritarian, populist nationalism observed 
in many countries are major issues. Given this situation, 
the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda must not be 
allowed to be relegated to the bottom of the international 
 political agenda. 
Implementing decarbonization strategies 
Implementing the Paris Agreement will demand a 
uniquely strenuous effort from the global community. If 
emissions remain at current levels, the global CO2 bud-
get for limiting global warming to 2°C will be exhausted 
within 20 years. If we are to keep global warming below 
the 2°C guard rail, emissions will have to be reduced to 
zero by 2070 at the latest. To limit the increase in the 
global temperature to 1.5°C, we will need zero emis-
sions by 2050. This will only be achieved by fundamen-
tally transforming energy systems and other high-emis-
sions infrastructures and substantially changing citi-
zens’ behaviour. 
There is a risk that some countries – in order to avoid 
a rapid phase-out of fossil energies – will engage in a 
massive expansion of nuclear energy and large-scale 
deployment of untested technologies such as carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (CCS, also in combination 
with bioenergy – BECCS), possibly supplemented by 
 Summary
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high-risk geoengineering measures, e.g. manipulation of 
the global radiation budget.
The WBGU is proposing a much lower-risk alterna-
tive for preventing the global temperature from rising 
by more than 2°C. It recommends rapidly decarbonizing 
energy infrastructure, greatly accelerating the expansion 
and development of renewable energies, and effectively 
curtailing energy consumption. To bring about such a 
transformation, the WBGU is presenting a decadal car-
bon roadmap to plot the profound changes that will be 
necessary in coming decades. Its proposals range from 
effective CO2 pricing and an end to fossil fuel subsidies 
(by 2020), denying licences for new vehicles with com-
bustion engines (by 2030) and large-scale deployment 
of renewable energy technologies as well as energy stor-
age and transport (by 2040), to complete decarboniza-
tion of the G20 economies (by 2050). 
The G20’s leadership role
G20 countries are responsible for 82% of CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuels, so the G20, with its formative influ-
ence on the world’s economy and politics, must play a 
leading role in implementing the 2030 Agenda and the 
Paris Agreement. The G20 countries should, for exam-
ple, increase the reductions they announced within the 
framework of the UNFCCC to reconcile them with the 
goals agreed on in Paris. The WBGU also recommends 
that the G20 adopt the decadal carbon roadmap. Based 
on this roadmap, G20 countries should develop compre-
hensive and verifiable national decarbonization strate-
gies for, inter alia, phasing out the use of fossil fuels by 
2050 and preserving natural ecosystems, with their car-
bon stocks und sink functions.
The Four Big ‘I’s: Innovation, Infrastructure, 
Investment, Inclusion
If we are to pursue this challenging path, the Four Big 
‘I’s must become part of the G20 programme: a reori-
entation of Innovation to make it possible to develop 
economies and prosperity within the guard rails of the 
Earth system; a rapid, climate-friendly and resource-ef-
ficient modification of the global economy’s central 
Infrastructures; the creation of framework conditions 
for stimulating more Investment in the transformation 
towards sustainability; and linking these goals with the 
principle of social Inclusion, i.e. equity and participa-
tion, which should guide all these actions and is both 
a precondition and a goal of the societal transformation 
towards sustainability. G20 governments should advo-
cate for the Four Big ‘I’s of transformation. To achieve 
all these goals, the WBGU believes that the proactive 
state – one that actively sets priorities, publicizes them 
explicitly, and gives its citizens greater opportunities 
to raise their voices, to participate in decision-making 
and to be actively engaged in their societies – must be 
 strengthened.
Establish transformative sovereign wealth funds 
The nations participating in the 2030 Agenda and the 
Paris Agreement will need to develop effective national 
policy instruments to implement the goals they have set. 
The WBGU recommends in particular that G20 countries 
establish transformative sovereign wealth funds, which 
we also call ‘future funds’. These could enable G20 
countries to be more active in financial markets as stake-
holders, with the goal of promoting socially responsi-
ble structural change to create a sustainable economic 
and social system. These future funds should draw their 
revenues from CO2 taxes and emissions trading as well 
as from a generational component levied on estates. 
The investments made by the transformative sovereign 
wealth funds should be oriented towards climate change 
targets and the SDGs; profits should be used to advance 
equity and the common good. 
Using sustainability and climate policy to solve 
global political problems 
G20 governments should become involved as pioneers 
in this area not only ‘at home’, but also at the inter-
national level, and help to strengthen cooperation and 
solve global problems. If correctly configured and stra-
tegically used, the Four Big ‘I’s of sustainability and 
climate policy could serve to leverage solutions to global 
political problems. 
First: A far-seeing climate and sustainability  policy 
could become a modernization project for the global 
economy. It could open up opportunities for economic 
development by inspiring innovation and creating sus-
tainable investment and employment prospects, and 
it could help channel investments into technologies, 
companies and infrastructures that will secure a better 
future in the long term. 
Second: Climate and sustainability policy could 
become an equity project at the national level and pro-
mote inclusion by making decarbonization strategies 
socially responsible, combating inequality and strength-
ening social cohesion. 
Third: Tackling shared sustainability and climate 
 policy challenges could become a peace project, enabling 
countries that otherwise do not cooperate, or are in open 
conflict with one another, to establish mutual trust. This 
would require inclusion at the global level to defuse con-
flicts over resources and their distribution and to coun-
teract civil wars and mass migration. 
3This report begins with a long overdue clarification and 
ends with a well-founded hope.
The clarification
In the first decades of the 21st century, the global econ-
omy has stalled and inequality increased further in 
many countries. It is by no means the detrimental inter-
ventions of a sustainability policy that are to blame for 
this development. On the contrary, political measures 
in this area have to date been so powerless that global 
warming and species extinction are now progressing at 
a terrifying speed.
This is occurring even though almost all the precondi-
tions normally regarded as conducive to the flourishing 
of global markets (and their customers) have been met. 
Many nation states are vying with each other to deregu-
late their economies and offer companies tax reductions. 
Central banks are incessantly pumping cheap money 
into national economies, even though private liquidity 
has now reached historically high levels and the planet 
is veritably flooded with low-priced fossil fuels.
And yet the mature economies, as well as some 
emerging economies, are stagnating, the real interest 
rate has fallen to zero, investment activity is declining, 
in many countries essential infrastructure is deteriorat-
ing, and the youth unemployment rate is dramatically 
high, including in many areas of Europe. Broad seg-
ments of society are experiencing shrinking real incomes 
and feel that they are further lagging behind national 
and global elites. It must again be emphasized that the 
dynamics of these crises are not caused by what are still 
fairly timid environmental regulations, but by the inter-
nal logic of an industrial system, driven by fossil fuels, 
that can generate prosperity for the many only while in 
expansion mode and at the same time passes on most of 
the true costs of growth to vulnerable income earners 
and future generations – whether in the form of social 
debasement, spectacular levels of national debt or the 
destruction of natural life support systems. It is alarm-
ing that the traditional model of the global economy no 
longer works, even though the future costs are being 
ignored. It is therefore evident that a model of prosper-
ity that no longer works, but causes major damage every 
day, must be questioned and restructured. This will take 
transformation, not repair.
This is not to say that the benchmarks of modern 
 society – development in the sense of material and 
 cultural progress and equity in the form of fair opportu-
nities for individuals – have to be disregarded. Western 
democracy’s most precious achievement in this context, 
namely the right to self-determined personal develop-
ment in an open society, should by no means be impaired. 
However, the framework within which this develop-
ment can take place must now be redefined, which is the 
inherent responsibility of politics in the service of the 
greater common good. Therefore, the mission of today 
must be the transformation to a sustainable global soci-
ety and world economy! G20 countries must play a lead-
ing role in this transformation. Two observations should 
be made in this context.
Observation 1: Transformation to sustainability is 
possible
The transition to a sustainable economy will require 
binding objectives and a powerful operative concept. 
Despite substantial resistance and countless setbacks, 
multilateralism – cooperation between nations at the 
international level, namely in the UN system – achieved 
an important shared objective in 2015 with the proc-
lamation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
goals compiled in the 2030 Agenda and the signing of 
the Paris Agreement for global climate protection under 
the auspices of the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. This is rightly regarded as a historic success. The 
2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement are also currently 
the only ambitious initiatives involving all nations. 
These two projects for the benefit of mankind could 
bring together actors that otherwise do not cooperate or 
are engaged in serious conflicts. How can we breathe life 
into this ambitious vision? What steps should the G20 
countries take to realise it?
Before answers can be given to these questions, the 
WBGU declares unequivocally that the now largely 
globalized project of modern society – the campaign 
against climate change – will fail if the global objec-
tives painstakingly hammered out in multilateral pro-
cesses and institutions in 2015 are not taken seriously. 
The climate crisis has grown dramatically worse in recent 
years, a development entirely in line with the best pro-
jections of international science. In contrast to the sit-
uation a few years ago, its existence is now rarely dis-
puted among scientists and is now only denied by polit-
ical actors who position themselves as ‘post-factual’ and 
operate explicitly outside the limits of truth and real-
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ity. The Paris  resolutions, and especially the agreement 
to limit anthropogenic global warming to 1.5–2°C, are 
an appropriate global political reaction to a threat that 
can no longer be denied. Implementing these resolutions 
will require a major, historically unique effort towards a 
modernization based on evidence and solidarity. 
These issues will be dealt with in more detail in Chap-
ter 2, in view of the fact that climate change has long 
since come dangerously close to crossing the red lines 
identified in the Paris Agreement. Also, humanity is now 
close to reaching other planetary limits within which 
the progress of civilization can develop with reasonable 
security. Water resources, fertile soil and biodiversity are 
all coming under mounting pressure, while the input of 
pollutants and toxins into the natural environment are 
increasing almost exponentially. The almost irreversible 
pollution of the world’s oceans (WBGU, 2013) is per-
haps the most scandalous expression of this worrying 
development. The 2030 Agenda, with its 17 fundamen-
tal SDGs is a policy response to this multidimensional 
challenge. However, the WBGU is of the opinion that 
dealing with the climate crisis is the conditio sine qua non 
for global society in the 21st century, which is why this 
paper intensively examines this topic.
State of the art scientific research shows that rising 
global temperatures can only be limited to less than 2°C 
if the global economic system is largely decarbonized by 
2050. We must immediately set out on the path neces-
sary to achieve this transformation so that global emis-
sions can peak by around 2020. This is explained in more 
detail in Chapter 2. The WBGU has also examined alter-
native scenarios that rely less on rapid efforts towards 
transformation now, and more on massive technical 
interventions (e.g. geoengineering) later (Box 3.2-1). 
The WBGU takes the view that such strategies are irre-
sponsible in several ways. Researchers cannot yet ade-
quately answer the question of whether ‘negative emis-
sions’ achieved through low-risk measures, such as 
afforestation campaigns, should supplement decarbon-
ization after the middle of this century. It is quite evi-
dent, however, that such measures cannot replace the 
fastest possible phasing out of a fossil fuel-based econ-
omy. Thus, all efforts should be directed towards devel-
oping a 2050 Agenda for transformation and decarbon-
ization.
Observation 2: International crises and a movement 
against transformation, cooperation and democracy 
are jeopardising the transition to sustainability 
The success stories of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 
Agenda are offset by bi-national, multinational and 
international crises. Wars, civil wars, transnational ter-
rorism and mass migration are issues currently dominat-
ing global politics. Serious tensions and frosty political 
relationships are making cooperation between relevant 
actors, including G20 countries, more difficult. Ten years 
after the global financial crisis, debt and banking crises, 
with their negative effects on tax revenues and growth, 
are still on the international agenda. The EU, the prime 
example of cooperation among regional governments, is 
mired in an existential crisis. German diplomat, former 
State Secretary of the German Federal Foreign Office and 
Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang 
Ischinger, has spoken of an impending era of disintegra-
tion of the world order. In an environment  dominated 
by crises, the transformation to sustainability risks being 
relegated to the margins of the G20 agenda.
This international turbulence is mirrored by cri-
sis-ridden developments in many societies, including 
some within the G20. The belief that globalization cre-
ates growing disparities, inequality and social discord 
has become widespread. It has often been the poorest 
who have borne the consequences of financial market 
crises, while powerful multinational companies use sys-
tematic tax avoidance strategies to reduce their contri-
butions to financing public assets. The OECD estimates 
the resulting national revenue losses at US$ 100–240 
billion per year (OECD, 2015). The Panama Papers have 
come to symbolize the way in which wealthy segments 
of the population shirk their responsibility for contrib-
uting to the common good through tax evasion. These 
dynamics lend credence to the impression that global-
ization is an elite project, which has contributed to the 
rise of authoritarian, populist nationalism in many coun-
tries. ‘Our country first’ movements represent rejections 
of international cooperation and the protection of global 
public assets. The ‘Great Transformation to Sustainabil-
ity’ (WBGU, 2011) is opposed by an authoritarian, 
neo-nationalist ‘counter-transformation’ that threatens 
the future viability and security of our societies, rule of 
law and democracy. 
At this juncture, Germany’s G20 presidency should 
demonstrate approaches and solutions for a transition to 
a sustainable international community based on coop-
eration. If this transition does not succeed, it is feared 
that sustainability policy and approaches towards func-
tional global governance and achievements of the rule 
of law and democracy will be drawn into the vortex of 
global confrontations and internal crises facing many 
G20 countries. 
The WBGU’s perspective on required action 
The historic resolutions agreed upon in Paris in 2015 
and the 2030 Agenda were made in an era of volatile 
and escalating national and international conflicts that 
demand short-term crisis management and much politi-
cal attention, and could make it harder to establish long-
term sustainability reforms. In this situation, political 
leadership, farsightedness and a broad view of the world 
will be required to prevent the resolutions of the Paris 
Agreement and the 2030 Agenda from being relegated 
to the bottom of the international list of policy priorities. 
Building on preliminary work carried out during 
 China’s presidency (e.g. the ‘Action Plan on the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development’; G20, 2016a), 
Germany’s G20 presidency in 2017 is an excellent 
opportunity to tackle the necessary transformation to 
sustainability not isolated from, but in connection with 
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the many other major issues facing global politics. The 
WBGU recommends that the G20 design the transforma-
tion to sustainability to become
 > a central engine for modernising the stagnating global 
economy, 
 > an equity project for a global community that is drift-
ing apart, and 
 > an international peace and cooperation project in an 
era of rampant violence for many regions of the 
world. 
To promote this recommendation, the WBGU has devel-
oped a narrative in Chapter 3 that is based on its ‘Great 
Transformation’ scenario presented in 2011 (WBGU, 
2011), updates it to reflect the latest research, and 
shapes it into a bundle of concrete recommendations for 
decision-makers (ranging from governments to consum-
ers). 
One fundamental prerequisite for implementing 
these proposals is the guiding principle of the proactive 
state. Public institutions, markets, civil society and sci-
ence must be brought into a new balance to advance 
the transition to sustainability as a global modernization 
project. The first big globalization crisis between 1910 
and 1930 sent the leading industrialized nations of the 
period into a state of dangerous tension and triggered 
a hysterical nationalism that suffocated the intellectual, 
cultural and technological creativity of the period, par-
alysed international initiatives such as the League of 
Nations, and finally led to two world wars. Only Amer-
ica’s New Deal policy was able to stymie the impetus of 
a nationalist austerity plan, building welfare-state bar-
riers against economic decline. In this current globaliza-
tion crisis, we need another ‘New Deal’, a (global) social 
contract for sustainability and inclusion, that extends 
beyond the boundaries of nation states, and can over-
come the global economy’s current stagnation and inte-
grate it into the project of restoring harmony between 
civilization and nature.
G20 countries produce 80% of the world’s aggre-
gate output (World Bank, 2016a) and 82% of green-
house gases from fossil fuels (IEA, 2015a), making them 
essential actors in global political and socio-economic 
affairs and the main addressees of this study. Issues 
such as innovation, investment and infrastructure are 
regularly on the G20 agenda. In 2016, the highly rel-
evant issue of limiting socio-economic disparities and 
promoting inclusion was added to the list (G20, 2016b). 
These are the central concepts around which this spe-
cial report revolves: Innovation, Infrastructure, Invest-
ment and Inclusion, the Four Big ‘I’s. Germany should 
use its G20 presidency in 2017 to consolidate these con-
cepts into a cohesive vision of progress. To help it do so, 
the WBGU has drafted a series of proposals described in 
detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
To make this debate more concrete, the WBGU is 
bringing two new policy elements into play, namely 
a decadal carbon roadmap and transformative sover-
eign wealth funds. With respect to the first element, 
the WBGU, with a view to the latest research and pros-
pects offered by technology, has developed a roadmap 
for the transition from a fossil-nuclear to an efficient- 
renewable economy, which was agreed upon de facto in 
the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. It explic-
itly proposes innovations that must be introduced in 5 
or 10-year stages in the relevant socio-economic sectors, 
such as a swift substitution of coal in the energy sec-
tor, electrification of the transport sector well before 
2050, and rapid reform to make the food sector sustain-
able. One potentially decisive instrument of moderniza-
tion that the WBGU recommends to G20 countries is the 
establishment of ‘future funds’. This proposal is inspired 
by institutions like Norway’s government pension funds 
(Statens pensjonsfond utland), which are financed by oil 
and gas revenues yet are much more than just pension 
funds in their intention and effect. Such transformative 
sovereign wealth funds could turn the countries tasked 
with the responsibility for sustainability into proac-
tive agents for change. A range of options are available: 
direct investment in future projects, public-private part-
nerships for mobilising and leveraging private liquidity, 
a market presence in the form of a ‘federal shareholder’ 
(Corneo, 2015) and financial support for accompanying 
socially relevant conversion processes.
One German example excellently illustrates the effect 
of this double approach. The updating of the German 
Climate Action Plan, which has been required since 
the Paris Agreement of 2015, will have to be oriented 
towards the Four Big ‘I’s, especially concerning the com-
plete end to the use of coal in the fourth decade of the 
21st century. Affected regions will have to be offered 
prospects for modernization (such as the building of 
competitive industrial capacity in the area of energy 
storage), and the transformation process will require 
both funding and socio-political support for it to suc-
ceed in the time allowed.
The WBGU also goes a step further towards mak-
ing its proposals more concrete by recommending the 
financing of a German future fund and their equivalents 
in other G20 countries (Box 3.3-1). It takes the view 
that this requires a structural tax reform that is oriented 
towards demands made in the 2030 Agenda and the Paris 
Agreement, no longer ignores what have become noto-
rious externalities (such as destruction of the environ-
ment and detriment to human health) and contri butes 
to a significant reduction in social inequality. Along with 
progressive CO2 pricing, the issue of inheritance should 
no longer be considered taboo in this context.
The hope 
As emphasized above, the post-war model of globalized 
wealth creation based on fossil fuels is grinding to a 
halt, yet this negative evaluation still fails to consider 
the resulting intergenerational damage. However, the 
WBGU is convinced that sustainably transforming this 
model will yield a double dividend. Not only will it pre-
vent a fatal degradation of the global environment, it 
could also create the basis for a new economic dyna-
mism, with positive effects on employment, prosper-
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ity and equity. To put it more pointedly, there are many 
indications that it is not the global economy that must be 
transformed to save the climate, but rather, it is the inno-
vation required to sustain the natural life-support systems 
that will rescue the global economy! The decarbonization 
described in Chapter 3 is nothing less than an industrial 
revolution on a global scale.
As the WBGU explains in detail in Chapter 4, the 
transformation dividend could be even greater. Climate 
and sustainability policy can help to maintain internal 
and external peace by defusing conflicts over resources 
and their distribution as well as preventing civil wars 
and mass migration. In contrast, limitless exploitation of 
nature undermines peace between nations. Climate pro-
tection and the 2030 Agenda could become a project for 
modernization, equity and peace. 
The WBGU recommends to the G20 the following 
narrative for orienting the world economy towards the 
2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement:
1. Sustainability policy is not a luxury, not even in 
 difficult geopolitical times. Delays in implementing 
the Paris Agreement and unabated climate change 
would further inflame current and future conflicts 
in the international community. Many societies 
would be overwhelmed and destabilized by the con-
sequences of uncontrolled global warming (WBGU, 
2008, 2014a). 
2. The 2030 Agenda is an ambitious, future-oriented 
response to the forces sowing social discord, to the 
concerns of many sceptics of globalization and to the 
anxious nationalist reactions proliferating in many 
countries. It is becoming clear that decarbonization 
and the establishment of resource-efficient recycling 
economies can only succeed against a background 
of social reform and the improvement of develop-
mental and life prospects for all people. Such pros-
pects can counter authoritarian, nationalist move-
ments that reject international cooperation as well 
as the narrow points of view that overly herald a free 
market economy, which have long ignored the social 
 inequality and segregation they foster.
3. The Paris decisions can make climate policy, a symbol 
of deadlocked multilateralism for over two decades, 
into a beacon of hope for a renewed culture of global 
cooperation in an era of dangerous international ten-
sions. Both global sustainability agreements are des-
tined to fail if G20 countries do not make massive 
efforts to advance them.
4. The Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda pro-
pose policies that can create prospects for coopera-
tion and a better future as well as stem the destruc-
tive effects of renationalization in many societies 
and of the escalating conflicts and violence in the 
international system. It can be demonstrated that a 
global transformation to sustainability could in effect 
also be a project for modernization, equity and peace. 
An intelligent climate and sustainability policy could 
serve to modernise the global economy and open up 
opportunities for economic development by creat-
ing major investment opportunities and sustainable 
employment as well as channelling money away 
from unproductive and speculative forms of invest-
ment and into industries and companies that will be 
viable and sustainable in future. Climate and sustain-
ability policy can also become an equity policy if it 
can make decarbonization strategies socially respon-
sible, combat inequality effectively and strengthen 
social cohesion. Climate and sustainability policy 
could contribute to maintaining peace by defusing 
conflicts over resources and their distribution, and 
thus prevent civil wars and mass migration.
5. Decarbonization plays a central role in the transfor-
mation to sustainability and is an essential element 
of the 2030 Agenda; without combating climate 
change, the SDGs, especially the radical reduction 
of poverty and inequality, cannot be implemented. 
At the same time, decarbonization can only suc-
ceed within the context of the SDGs, e.g. by mas-
sively expanding renewable energies while provid-
ing access to modern energy for the billions of peo-
ple living in energy poverty, and by modifying, in 
a socially responsible way, production and industry 
that damage the climate. 
6. As a project for global modernization, equity and 
peace, a transformative climate and sustainability 
policy will entail:
•	A redirection in technological and social Innova-
tion to enable the progress of economy and pros-
perity within the guard rails of the Earth system;
•	A rapid, climate-friendly and resource-efficient 
modification of the central Infrastructures of 
national economies and the global economy;
•	The creation of appropriate framework conditions 
to trigger a boost in Investment in the transforma-
tion to sustainability;
•	The connection of all these goals with the guid-
ing principle of social Inclusion, i.e. equity and 
 participation; after all, inclusion will not simply 
emerge spontaneously and represents at once a 
precondition and a goal of a successful societal 
transformation towards sustainability.
To accelerate this transformation and align it with the 
Four Big ‘I’s, the WBGU promotes the idea of a  proactive 
state – one embedded in a new balance between econ-
omy and civil society with the involvement of science 
– and proposes a tax reform oriented towards the 2030 
Agenda to generate transformative sovereign wealth 
funds in helping implement future decarbonization 
strategies. 
7The following considerations focus on climate protec-
tion, its new grounding in international law, and the 
requirements for action that have increased as a result, 
above all in terms of global infrastructure. Only by also 
considering other sustainability goals can a climate pro-
tection strategy make a successful contribution to a 
global project in support of modernization, equity and 
peace (Chapter 4).
2 .1
What was decided in Paris 
The Paris Agreement adopted on 12 December 2015 at 
the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is 
a milestone in climate policy. Its central achievement is 
the determination of binding quality goals for the pro-
tection of the climate for nearly the entire international 
community.
The Paris Agreement is a treaty in the sense of the 
Vienna Agreement on treaties between states (Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969) and devel-
ops – in correspondence to the mandate from Durban 
– fundamental binding obligations for the contracting 
 parties (pacta sunt servanda; Schlacke, 2016; Bodle et 
al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, the respective regulations of the Paris 
Agreement vary in scope in terms of their binding force; 
they address goals, concrete obligations, general guide-
lines still lacking details and mere recommendations. 
However, provisions stipulating concrete action, acqui-
escence or omission are the exception. The target audi-
ence also varies (parties to the agreement, developed 
countries, developing countries, secretariat, etc.). In this 
respect, the binding force of the agreement is dependent 
on the details of each individual regulation. The posi-
tioning of the G20 countries vis-à-vis the implementa-
tion of the Paris Agreement is thus of great importance.
The goal in Article 2.1 (a) – to hold the increase in 
the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to even limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C – is binding for all parties 
(Frank, 2016). For the first time, the international com-
munity has agreed under international law to a quan-
tified climate protection goal. As a result, the “danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” 
from Article 2 of the UNFCCC has been defined in con-
crete terms (WBGU, 2014a; Morgenstern and Dehnen, 
2016). Only through further specification can both the 
2°C goal and the 1.5°C goal be enforced, monitored and 
non-compliance be sanctioned (Schlacke, 2016).
Although the global long-term goal from Article 4.1, 
aimed at all parties, to reach global peaking of green-
house gas emissions as soon as possible, followed by a 
swift reduction in order to achieve a balance between 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of the cen-
tury, is a binding goal, without further specification it 
can be neither enforced, monitored nor can non-com-
pliance be sanctioned. The aim is greenhouse gas neu-
trality in the second half of the century, which need not 
be reached exclusively through the mitigation of green-
house gas emissions, but also leaves open the establish-
ment of geoengineering measures aimed at the crea-
tion of CO2 sinks (e.g. afforestation, ocean fertilization, 
ocean alkalization; Morgenstern and Dehnen, 2016). Not 
included, however, are measures addressing solar radia-
tion management, i.e. geoengineering technologies that 
target temperature limitations through the shielding of 
solar radiation (Box 2.3-2), as the sense, purpose and 
wording of Article 4.1 (‘removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases’) are limited to emissions and sinks of greenhouse 
gases. According to Article 1.8 of the UNFCCC, sinks 
are processes by which climate-relevant substances are 
removed from the atmosphere (e.g. CO2 uptake by for-
ests, oceans or technological procedures). These goals 
are to be reached above all through Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions (NDCs). NDCs can target climate 
mitigation and adaptation, yet do not serve to address 
loss and damage (Article 3). The parties are obligated to 
communicate NDCs, and communicate every five years 
further developed and enhanced NDCs, as well as report 
in a clear and transparent manner their development, 
achievement and adherence (Articles 4.2, 4.3, 4.8, 13.7 
(b)). There is a duty to act per se ( Morgenstern and 
Dehnen, 2016), without concrete targets being speci-
fied. This represents both opportunity and responsi-
bility for the nation states that are tasked with imple-
menting the Paris goals. Since the failure to reach the 
announced NDCs is not sanctionable according to the 
Paris Agreement, the countries must make national pro-
visions to guarantee enforcement of their commitments, 
or to issue sanctions in the case of nonattainment. The 
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double counting of emissions reductions is strictly for-
bidden (Article 6.5). The UNFCCC secretariat is obligated 
to record NDCs and adaptation measures (Articles 4.12, 
7.12).
The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) or NDCs announced thus far are not always 
quantified or quantifiable. In order to measure them 
against the long-term temperature goal (well below 2°C) 
and the global long-term emissions goals formulated in 
Article 4.1, as well as to be able to verify the compliance 
efforts by the parties, uniform standards for the commu-
nication of NDCs must be developed. The success of the 
Agreement depends in large part on the improvement of 
the national contributions (Arens et al., 2015). 
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agree-
ment relies on all states assuming responsibility, be they 
industrialized countries, emerging economies or devel-
oping countries. Nevertheless, the Agreement refers 
back to a core principle of the UNFCCC: the principal of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” (Article 3 
of the UNFCCC; Article 2 (2) of the Paris Agreement). 
Thus, industrialized countries are assigned a leading 
role, e.g. in determining NDCs (Schlacke, 2016).
The promotion of adaptation measures has become 
part of the goal specifications of the Paris Agreement 
(Article 2 (1) (b)). As a result, adaptation to climate 
change has seen increased attention (Morgenstern and 
Dehnen, 2016; Doelle, 2016) and should be further 
strengthened. Adaptation measures can initially pre-
pare population groups to face current and likely future 
impacts of climate change, and thus indirectly combat 
causes of flight. From the perspective of the WBGU, 
flight or migration as a reaction to the impacts of climate 
change can be understood as the ultima ratio of adapta-
tion. The theme of migration is thus far treated under 
‘displacement’, e.g. under the umbrella of ‘loss and dam-
age’, only in the decision text that accompanies the Paris 
Agreement – non-binding under international law – and 
is subject to the Warsaw Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2015b: 
§§ 50–51; WBGU, 2014a).
Compensation for loss and damage resulting from 
climate change was not considered. Although loss and 
damage is addressed in Article 8 of the Paris Agree-
ment, the parties made it clear that they considered this 
regulation not to include compensation or liability for 
damages directly or indirectly related to climate change 
( Morgenstern and Dehnen, 2016; Doelle, 2016). How-
ever, in the opinion of the WBGU the mere mention 
that loss and damage resulting from climate change is 
a problem in need of addressing is insufficient. One is 
almost bound to interpret such a weak formulation as 
taking it off the agenda. Rather, the causing of loss or 
damage should have concrete legal consequences, such 
as claims for compensation for small island states. The 
WBGU  recommends beginning a discussion focussed on 
who must pay for these damages, how they will be com-
pensated, and where, how and by whom claims can be 
enforced. Only by addressing these questions can future 
conflicts be avoided.
The issue of climate (protection) financing found 
prominent placement in the Paris Agreement as part of 
the goal specifications in Article 2.1 (c) (Morgenstern 
and Dehnen, 2016). Article 9 refers back to the obli-
gation of industrialized countries, under the UNFCCC, 
to provide financial support for developing countries. 
However, concrete obligations, such as providing US$ 
100 billion annually, were only addressed in the decision 
text (§ 54) that accompanies the Paris Agreement (Bodle 
et al., 2016). A legally binding phase-out of subsidies for 
fossil fuels was not agreed upon (Doelle, 2016). Rather, 
the focus of the measures agreed upon in Paris was on 
procedural provisions creating transparency. Therefore, 
the WBGU finds it important that (1) this procedural 
framework is filled out with measures (Section 4.3), and 
(2) the industrialized countries as well as emerging econ-
omies bear concrete financial obligations to promote 
climate mitigation and climate adaptation measures. In 
this vein, the G20 states should assume a leading role.
Overall, the Paris Agreement sends a very impor-
tant signal for international climate protection. The 
framework created in Paris must soon be filled out with 
national measures. In this respect, what is needed most, 
besides the standardization and monitoring of NDCs, 
are ambitious, additional decarbonization efforts by the 
parties.
2 .2
Limiting warming and avoiding climate extremes
Since the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC 
in Copenhagen in 2009, limiting global warming to 2°C 
above preindustrial levels has been part of the interna-
tional discussion. Climate impact research shows that 
exceeding this planetary guard rail makes dangerous 
anthropogenic impacts on weather and climate more 
likely (e.g. an increasing number of extreme weather 
events, droughts, floods, the disappearance of mountain 
glaciers, irreversible melting of Greenland’s ice sheet, a 
strong rise in sea levels); however, hazards can occur 
even without exceeding this limit (WBGU, 1995, 2003, 
2009b; UNFCCC, 2015a). The warming is not the same 
everywhere, but varies widely depending on region. For 
instance, the Arctic is warming at a rate that is more than 
twice the global average (Cohen et al., 2014). Also, the 
rise in sea levels varies regionally (Rhein et al., 2013). 
Therefore, impacts of climate change will vary widely by 
region. The goal decided upon in Paris to not only keep 
the increase in the Earth’s average surface temperature 
well under 2°C in comparison to pre-industrial levels, 
but to undertake efforts to limit the temperature rise to 
1.5°C, would considerably reduce the risks and impacts 
of changes in climate and is thus recommended from a 
precautionary point of view. As a consequence, only an 
additional warming of 0.5–1°C would be tolerable, since 
the global temperature has already risen approx. 1°C 
from 1880 to 2015 (Hansen et al., 2016; Figure 2.2-1). 
The latest measurements show that every single month 
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Figure 2 .2-1
Development of the mean 
global surface temperature 
between 1880 and 2015. 
The graph shows the 
temperature deviation as 
compared to the average 
value in the years between 
1951 and 1980.
Source: WBGU, on the basis 
of data from the Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies 
(NASA, 2016)
Figure 2 .2-2
Global mean surface temperature increase as a function of cumulative CO2 emissions. The chart summarizes results from various
models. Depending on the scenario, certain figures are reached for cumulative emissions at different times (coloured bold lines
and dots; the highlighted area shows the variance in the model results and scenarios). In these scenarios the effects of other
greenhouse gases on the temperature are also taken into account. The thin black line with the grey-shaded area indicating the
spread shows the extent of warming if no other greenhouse gases, i.e. only CO2, were emitted; an increase in CO2 of 1% per
annum was assumed.
Source: IPCC, 2013; Knutti and Rogelj, 2015
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from October 2015 to August 2016 has been warmer on 
average than all previous respective months since tem-
peratures began being recorded (NASA, 2016).
The level of warming that will be reached depends 
decisively on the amount of CO2 humankind contin-
ues to release into the atmosphere. Comprehensive 
analyses have shown that the average global air tem-
perature at the Earth’s surface correlates almost lin-
early to the amount of CO2 emitted since the begin-
ning of industrialization (IPCC, 2014a; Figure 2.2-2). In 
order to limit warming to 1.5°C or 2°C with a probabil-
ity of two-thirds, future cumulative emissions may not 
exceed 200 Gt CO2 or 800 Gt CO2 respectively. These fig-
ures were derived as follows: according to the Synthe-
sis Report of the latest Assessment Report of the IPCC 
(2014a), in 2011 a budget of 400 Gt CO2 remained in 
order to limit the warming of the Earth to a maximum 
of 1.5°C, or 1,000 Gt CO2 for 2°C (with a probability of 
66%). In the last five years, global emissions reached 
roughly 40 Gt CO2 per year, of which the burning of fos-
sil fuels accounted for around 32 Gt CO2, cement pro-
duction and other industrial processes around 4 Gt CO2 
and changes in land use roughly 4 Gt CO2 (Global Car-
bon Project, 2016). Thus, each budget decreased by 200 
Gt CO2, meaning that as of 2016 a budget of 200 Gt CO2 
was available for reaching 1.5°C, and 800 Gt CO2 for 2°C. 
If global emissions remain at just under 40 Gt CO2 per 
year, in approximately five years cumulative emissions 
would reach a level at which the average global tem-
perature increase would remain just under 1.5°C with a 
probability of 66%; the corresponding level for a limit of 
2°C would be reached in 20 years. All additional emis-
sions would have to be compensated later by ‘negative 
emissions’, i.e. by removing CO2 from the atmosphere. 
However, at the moment the science is still unclear as 
to how exactly negative emissions affect the global car-
bon cycle, and which effects of previous emissions they 
can actually reverse (Fuss et al., 2014). Also unclear is 
how the Earth system as a whole would react to a swift 
reduction in CO2 concentrations.
In a scenario without effective climate mitigation, 
warming could reach more than 4°C by the end of this 
century (IPCC, 2014a). If all climate mitigation meas-
ures – (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions, 
(I)NDCs – announced so far by the parties to the Paris 
Agreement are implemented, the emissions would follow 
a path that could limit warming to under 3–3.5°C (UNEP, 
2015). By 2030, the current (I)NDCs, as compared to a 
business-as-usual path, would succeed in meeting 45% 
of the emissions reductions needed to reach a path com-
patible with 2°C (UNEP, 2015). Thus, keeping warming 
under 2°C (1.5°C) would require drastic – but quite fea-
sible – CO2 emissions reductions and a complete stop by 
2070 (2050) (Chapter 3). After emissions ceased, the air 
temperature would remain for several centuries at roughly 
the same level, which is more or less determined by cumu-
lative emissions. The level of CO2 in the atmosphere would 
decrease only slowly due to uptake by the ocean and bio-
sphere (Section 2.3;  Collins et al., 2013: 1106). 
2 .3
Sustainable management of natural and 
 anthropogenic carbon sinks
How much of the anthropogenic CO2 remains long term 
in the atmosphere and contributes to global warming 
depends on the interaction of CO2 sources and sinks. 
About half of the CO2 emitted since 1750 is still in the 
atmosphere, while the other half has been absorbed in 
more or less equal parts by the ocean and the terrestrial 
biosphere (Ciais et al., 2013). In the long term (i.e. over 
about 1,000 years), the oceans absorb the majority of 
the CO2 emitted by humans.
Due to the uptake of CO2, the pH-value of the ocean 
surface has already decreased by 0.1 as compared to 
preindustrial levels (Rhein et al., 2013: 294). This cor-
responds to an increase in the ocean’s acidity of almost 
30%. A continued progression of acidification could 
lead to critical strain on marine ecosystems and spe-
cies (e.g. coral reefs, calcifying organisms; WBGU, 2006, 
2013: 43; Ciais et al., 2013). The basis for the ocean 
functioning as a sink is the rise of CO2 in the atmos-
phere; the exchange of CO2 between atmosphere and 
ocean is driven by partial pressure differences in CO2 and 
can scarcely be influenced or stopped by humans (Figure 
2.3-1). Exceptions include methods of ocean alkaliza-
tion and ocean fertilization (geoengineering measures) 
described in Box 2.3-2.
In parallel to the ocean sink, terrestrial ecosystems 
not affected by land-use change have, since the begin-
ning of industrialization, increasingly functioned as 
Atmosphere
Ocean Terrestrial biosphere and products from biomass
Fossil energy sources
CO2 fluxes
completely 
controllable
CO2
fluxes cannot
be directly
controlled
CO2 fluxes
can only be
conrolled to
a small extent
1 2 3
Figure 2 .3-1
The global carbon cycle. Atmospheric CO2 concentration 
is largely determined by (1) The fluxes of CO2 between 
atmosphere and ocean; these are large natural fluxes of CO2 
that can scarcely be controlled by humans using today’s 
technology, (2) CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels. 
These fluxes are entirely human-induced and thus controllable. 
(3) The fluxes of CO2 between the terrestrial biosphere and 
the atmosphere. These are large, predominantly natural fluxes 
that can only be influenced by humans to a small extent 
(mainly through land-use change or land management). 
The reconfiguration of land use can within limits alter the 
distribution of carbon between the atmosphere and terrestrial 
biosphere. These measures are predominantly reversible. 
Source: WBGU, 2009a: 89
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sinks due to intensified photosynthesis, resulting in 
accelerated plant growth. This is also caused in part by 
the rise of the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and 
the increased input of nitrogen, as well as by the impacts 
of climate change, which include longer growth periods 
at mid and high latitudes (Ciais et al., 2013: 487). The 
conservation and restoration of natural ecosystems can 
contribute to maintaining these sink processes. Also, 
land-use change – e.g. the expansion and higher bio-
mass density of forests – can contribute to the uptake 
of CO2 and compensate for some of the emissions that 
are caused by other types of land-use change, such as 
deforestation. The terrestrial CO2 sink is subject to inter-
annual fluctuations and can disappear completely in 
some years (Ciais et al., 2013: 504).
Land use management as well as the conservation 
and restoration of natural ecosystems can contribute to 
climate protection in various ways:
 > Prevention of emissions caused by reducing natural 
carbon stocks, e.g. from deforestation and conversion 
of natural ecosystems in agricultural areas, 
 > Protection of ecosystems to maintain the capability 
of the terrestrial biosphere to function as a CO2 sink,
 > Facilitating the accumulation of carbon in soil or in 
the biomass on agricultural lands (e.g. through land 
or forest management, reforestation), 
 > Substitution of emissions-intensive materials and 
energy sources by using biomass to produce materials 
or generate energy (e.g. bioenergy, wood as a  building 
material).
Since fertile soil is a scarce, indispensable resource that 
cannot be substituted, these options are in competition 
not only with one another, but also with other demands 
for land use (WBGU, 2009a). Therefore, each large-scale 
change in land use should always be considered within 
the context of the entirety of the 2030 Agenda and the 
SDGs. This includes not only the primacy of food secur-
ity (SDG No. 2: “Ending hunger…”), but also, for exam-
ple, the long-term preservation of soil fertility, the con-
servation of biological diversity and ecosystem services 
(SDG No. 15) as well as the long-term substitution of 
materials made from petroleum (e.g. plastic) with bio-
based products. Thus, by no means can land use be opti-
mized solely for the purposes of climate protection, be it 
through large-scale afforestation or bioenergy use.
One much-discussed possibility for creating an 
anthropogenic CO2 sink (i.e. ‘negative emissions’) is the 
combination of bioenergy use with carbon dioxide cap-
ture and storage (Bioenergy with Carbon Dioxide Cap-
ture and Storage, or BECCS). This denotes a process that 
targets the permanent removal of CO2 from the atmos-
phere, where plant mass is used to generate energy and 
the released CO2 is captured from flue gas and stored 
in underground repositories (Box 2.3-1). The WBGU 
advises against viewing BECCS as a large-scale solution 
for climate protection. A limited application of BECCS 
based on the use of waste and residual materials as 
well as energy crops from cultivations that do not con-
flict with food production or the conservation of eco-
systems, could support efforts to limit anthropogenic 
climate change. With a presumed waste-material poten-
tial of 50 EJ for energy generation, about 3 Gt CO2 per 
year could theoretically be available for sequestration 
(WBGU, 2009a: 130). This corresponds to about one-
tenth of today’s annual emissions from the burning of 
fossil fuels.
The WBGU also advises against considering large-
scale afforestation, iron fertilization or the alkalization 
of the oceans as further possibilities for creating nega-
tive emissions, as these entail widely varying problems, 
potential harm and risks that are difficult or impossible 
to calculate (Box 2.3-2). 
Box 2 .3-1
Bioenergy and carbon storage (BECCS)
During growth, plants take up CO2 from the atmosphere by 
way of photosynthesis and convert it into biomass. Without 
human intervention, the overwhelming share of the CO2 is 
later released back into the atmosphere through metabolic 
processes or biodegradation. In order to remove the CO2 per-
manently from the atmosphere, the plant mass could be used 
to generate energy, whereby the released CO2 is captured from 
flue gas and stored permanently. This procedure, known as 
BECCS (Bioenergy with Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage), 
could create ‘negative emissions’ and lower the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2. From the standpoint of sustainability, a 
large-scale application of this technology presents two ques-
tions above all:
First: It must be guaranteed that the biomass used is gained 
in a sustainable way. Using energy crops cultivated expressly 
for this purpose will result in multifaceted competition with 
other land uses, such as those for food production and nature 
conservation. Depending on the cultivation system and land 
area used, the cultivation of energy crops can itself cause 
 considerable CO2 emissions. In its report titled ‘Future Bio-
energy and Sustainable Land Use’ (2009a), the WBGU pre-
sented comprehensive analyses of the potential of sustainable 
bioenergy and recommended to prioritize the use of waste and 
residual materials, as these sources face only scarce competi-
tion in terms of existing land use. The cultivation of energy 
crops especially for this purpose should preferably be carried 
out on marginal – i.e. less fertile – land, while perennial crops 
and energy grasses should generally be given priority over 
annual crops (WBGU, 2009a: 6).
Second: The question of CCS technology (Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage) and the feasibility of geological storage. 
In principle, CCS technology is technically mature and availa-
ble today, but it has yet to be tested on a large scale. The appli-
cation of CSS in the use or production of fossil fuels does not 
lead – as it does in combination with bioenergy – to negative 
emissions, but can only reduce anthropogenic emissions.
Since the availability of CO2 storage sites with long-term 
safety – i.e. storage sites that are sealed from the atmosphere 
– is unclear and acceptance of their use difficult to predict, 
BECCS could come into competition with CCS in connection 
with the use of fossil fuels (van Vuuren et al., 2013). In any 
case, a possible and relevant future use of BECCS will require 
further research and testing.
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Box 2 .3-2
An evaluation of geoengineering 
The term ‘geoengineering’ denotes the attempt to deliberately 
influence the climate system in order to reduce future global 
warming. It involves large-scale interventions into a complex 
system, the effects of which are insufficiently understood. 
There are two basic methods of geoengineering: the manipula-
tion of the Earth’s radiation budget (Solar Radiation Manage-
ment – SRM), which directly influences incoming solar radia-
tion, and the reduction of the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration 
(Carbon Dioxide Removal – CDR). Both methods are described 
in detail in the literature (e.g. The Royal Society, 2009; UBA, 
2011; Rickels et al., 2011).
Climate calculations using Earth system models have shown 
that most of the currently discussed processes can only slightly 
slow global warming (< 8%), and usually entail grave conse-
quences for the climate system and for ecosystems (Keller et 
al., 2014).
SRM would be the only method that could effectively reduce 
the warming of the Earth; however, the atmospheric cooling 
it would achieve would come with enormous side- effects 
and uncertainties. Firstly, SRM would present  un precedented 
 challenges to global intergovernmental cooperation, since SRM 
measures could be used by individual states to pursue their 
own purposes, yet would also have global effects. Further-
more, an intermediate abandonment of ongoing SRM geoengi-
neering would catapult the temperature of the Earth’s surface 
back to its ‘normal state’. The result would be rapid climate 
change within a few years (Keller et al., 2014), with unfore-
seeable consequences for humans and societies. Not least, the 
application of SRM would have considerable impact on sys-
tems of all orders of magnitude, such as monsoon circulation, 
local weather patterns, ocean circulation and the ozone layer. 
It is the opinion of the WBGU that the risks of applying SRM 
to counter climate change far outweigh its potential benefits. 
The WBGU therefore opposes the use of SRM.
In contrast to SRM, CDR could also address the problem of 
ocean acidification, while erratic changes to the Earth’s surface 
temperature, e.g. in the case of halting the use of SRM, could 
be more or less ruled out. Many CDR technologies are similar 
in the fact that they require an inordinate amount of land and 
could have partly considerable side effects for the biosphere 
and geosphere.
 > Ocean alkalization: The acceleration of the natural chemi-
cal decomposition of rock could theoretically cause CO2 to 
be more quickly withdrawn from the atmosphere and trans-
ferred into the ocean. The accelerated carbon capture can be 
achieved through the crushing and grinding of, for exam-
ple, olivine (limestone and silicate bedrock) (Köhler et al., 
2010). This process has requirements similar to those of 
mining, would be extremely energy-intensive and would 
warrant sizeable infrastructure and a considerable amount 
of rock (3 billion tonnes of olivine would be needed to neu-
tralise only 9% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions; Köhler et 
al., 2010). The crushed rock would then have to be intro-
duced over wide swaths of the ocean to eventually reach the 
deep waters. This method is highly invasive to both the land 
and the ocean, and many of its side effects are still inestima-
ble (e.g. the consequences of ocean alkalization on ecosys-
tems). The WBGU advises against this technology.
 > Manipulation of marine biomass production: The enhance-
ment of marine carbon sinks by increasing biomass growth 
in nutrient-poor regions of the ocean could be attainable 
through fertilization with micro- (e.g. iron, iron fertiliza-
tion) and macronutrients (e.g. nitrogen, phosphorus). The 
sinking of biomass into deeper ocean layers could lead to a 
long-term storage of fixed carbon. However, the effective-
ness of this method depends on various physical and bio-
logical  factors (e.g. deep-water formation or the prema-
ture re-emission of the stored carbon into the atmosphere 
through bacterial decomposition of the biomass). The 
results of model  studies and in situ experiments are some-
what contradictory and insufficiently reliable to quantify 
the  effectiveness of large-scale ocean fertilization (e.g. Jin 
et al., 2007; CBD, 2009; Smetacek et al., 2012). Given the 
only partially researched potential side effects of ocean fer-
tilization on marine ecosystems, the WBGU also opposes this 
method of geoengineering.
 > Large-scale afforestation: Due to the limited agricultural land 
and the competition between the production of food, lum-
ber and bioenergy as well as the conservation of biologi-
cal diversity, natural ecosystems and ecosystem services, 
large-scale afforestation would be sensible only in areas 
that are thus far unused and for which no valuable natu-
ral ecosystems would need to be converted. Several studies 
have focussed on the cultivation of semi-deserts and des-
erts by means of artificial irrigation using desalinated sea-
water (e.g. Sahara, Australian Outback; Ornstein et al., 2009; 
Keller et al., 2014). Simulations with Earth-system models 
show that although large-scale reforestation of these areas 
would slightly reduce the CO2 content of the air, the tem-
perature would not decrease, but even increase somewhat. 
This is largely due to the low reflectivity of forests in com-
parison to the desert, and thus the heightened absorption 
of solar radiation (Keller et al., 2014). Additional grave dis-
advantages include the immense cost of irrigating these 
desert areas and the consequences in case of a failure of 
 irrigation. Yet to be examined are the impacts of the destruc-
tion of  desert ecosystems and the likely strong reduction in 
the Saharan dust transport system and subsequently in the 
fertilization of the Atlantic Ocean and the Amazon rainfor-
est. Its high costs, negative impact on air temperature and 
its under-researched effects on ecosystems currently render 
this option inadvisable.
 > CO2 binding from air through chemical sequestration: The 
direct binding of CO2 from air could theoretically be achieved 
through chemical sequestration (Direct Air Capture – DAC). 
However, testing of this technology has thus far been lim-
ited to only a few areas, and the scaling of DAC to dimen-
sions that would have a significant influence on atmo-
spheric CO2 concentrations cannot be realized with today’s 
 technology and would be highly energy-intensive. Never-
theless, research and development work could significantly 
reduce energy requirements and costs (Lackner et al., 2012).
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2 .4
The transformation of infrastructure
The goals agreed upon in the Paris Agreement represent 
a considerable challenge for the transformation of global 
infrastructure. Considering the current state of affairs, 
transformation processes must be radically accelerated 
in order to execute the required leaps in technology. For 
example, combustion engines in the automobile industry 
must be replaced by emissions-free propulsion technol-
ogy well before the potential for improving the efficiency 
of combustion engines is exhausted, the requirements for 
which include corresponding infrastructure (e.g. charging 
stations). Urban development must also be rerouted. The 
tremendous surge in urbanization expected in the com-
ing decades (with an additional 2.5 billion city-dwellers 
by the middle of the century), including the resource- 
and climate-compatible design of our cities, is critical to 
a sustainable global development. The cities are where it 
will be decided whether the transformation towards sus-
tainability succeeds (WBGU, 2016a: 5 f.). 
However, this awareness is not yet prevalent among 
many decision-makers or in wide sections of the pub-
lic. Clear signals to industry from the G20 decision-mak-
ers would be very helpful in establishing a reliable plan-
ning horizon.
Key factor: Time
Fossil energies, at 32 Gt CO2, along with cement produc-
tion and industrial process, at 4 Gt CO2, are currently 
responsible for the bulk of annual greenhouse gas emis-
sions (Global Carbon Project, 2016; IPCC, 2014a: 45). 
These emissions are determined to a large degree by the 
configuration of global infrastructure systems. To reach 
the climate goal set in Paris, the future rate of decar-
bonization – measured as a reduction in carbon inten-
sity (t CO2 per € billion of GDP) – must reach levels 
 significantly higher than the past rate. Between 2000 
and 2014, global carbon intensity decreased annually by 
an average of 1.3%; however, achieving a stabilization 
of global warming under 2°C requires that the carbon 
intensity be reduced by a rate of more than 6% per year 
(PWC, 2015). This cannot be attained solely by substi-
tuting existing energy production infrastructure with 
low-emission or zero-emission alternatives, especially in 
light of the narrow timeframe. Rather, in addition to an 
accelerated expansion of renewable energies, efficiency 
and sufficiency measures must be implemented with 
equally high priority in all areas of industry and society.
Transformation potential: not to be underestimated
It is the opinion of the WBGU that the potential for a 
quick renewal of our present energy infrastructure has 
been underestimated. A strong technological transfor-
mation is already underway; the global power genera-
tion capacity of wind and sun has grown exponentially 
in recent years, whereby costs have decreased sharply 
(Figure 2.4-1).
Schellnhuber et al. (2016) have indicated a possible 
surpassing of tipping points for the transition to a purely 
renewable energy system, which are either insufficiently 
or not at all depicted in current mitigation narratives or 
scenarios. Fossil fuel capacities could thus be removed 
from the energy system much more quickly than is often 
assumed. Moreover, exit barriers such as profitability 
and ‘sunken’ costs can be addressed through regulatory 
or compensatory measures.
An additional important approach is a radical reduc-
tion in the use of cement in the building sector (WBGU, 
2016a). In future, wood could be used on a large scale, 
above all in housing construction. The fact that wood 
requires less energy to produce in comparison to con-
ventional construction materials (e.g. concrete, steel 
and aluminium) and entails no process emissions means 
considerable overall emissions savings. However, how 
much wood might be available on a sustainable basis is 
an open question that must be studied in more detail 
(Churkina, 2016). 
Another important determining factor, whose poten-
tial the WBGU finds often underestimated, is the trans-
formation of lifestyles and consumption patterns, which 
can prime and accompany infrastructural transforma-
tion. These options are not usually constrained by tech-
nological restrictions and could be immediately effec-
tive. One positive example is the currently ongoing 
transformation of dietary patterns in parts of Western 
societies. The reduction of the consumption of animal 
products could reduce the use of agricultural land, which 
could instead be used for other applications that are dif-
ficult to substitute, such as the production of wood or 
biomass for the building sector. 
Compliance with the climate mitigation goals set in 
Paris could be achieved through various technology 
portfolios, which are laden with different risks and diffi-
culties. One conceivable portfolio would contain a mas-
sive increase in nuclear energy, the large-scale appli-
cation of CCS and BECCS (e.g. in the RCP2.6 scenario; 
van Vuuren et al., 2011) and, if need be, geoengineer-
ing measures in case emissions reductions do not fol-
low at an adequate pace. However, it is the opinion of 
the WBGU that there is no justification for taking such 
risks as long as there are alternative portfolios fraught 
with far fewer risks.
One alternative portfolio with a completely differ-
ent focus comprises a highly accelerated expansion 
of renewable energies and simultaneous significant 
increase in energy efficiency, along with an accelerated 
phasing out of fossil fuel use. This would allow forego-
ing such mitigation options or technologies seen as too 
risky by the WBGU. Such a path is outlined in Section 
3.2 (Box 3.2-1). The WBGU proposes that within the 
space of possibilities a path should be taken that places 
highest priority on an accelerated expansion of renew-
able energies and employs riskier options like BECCS 
only to a small degree and as a fall-back option. The 
high-risk geoengineering options (Box 2.3-2) should 
be  abandoned altogether. The implementation of such 
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a path is described in Section 3.2 as part of a carbon 
roadmap.
2 .5
Recommendations
Halting the further warming of the climate requires a 
complete stop of CO2 emissions. To keep climate  warming 
below 2°C, these zero-emissions should be achieved 
by 2070 at the latest, and by as early as 2050 to meet 
the 1.5°C target. The global transformation should be 
 accelerated to decrease emissions and finally bring 
them to zero as quickly as possible. Core elements of 
this  transformation are the rapid expansion of renew-
able energies, the effective limiting of energy consump-
tion and the rapid phase-out of the use of fossil fuels. 
The application of technologies that are not yet mature 
or adequately tested – such as Carbon Dioxide Capture 
and Storage (CCS) or the combination of bioenergy use 
and CCS (BECCS) – should be avoided to the greatest 
possible extent. The WBGU recommends largely forgo-
ing the use of biomass in energy production, with the 
exception of waste and residual materials, and using the 
 available,  sustainable potential of biomass or wood as 
much as  possible in the building sector.
G20: Promoting transformation 
As key protagonists within the framework of the Paris 
Agreement, the governments of the G20 states should 
promote the global transformation to a climate-com-
patible society by 2020. During Germany’s G20 presi-
dency, the German federal government should strive for 
G20 consensus on a decarbonization goal similar to that 
which was agreed upon in 2015 at the G7 summit in 
Elmau.
 > The G20 should agree to reduce to zero their CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels by 2050. For their econ-
omies, they should develop comprehensive and 
 verifiable decarbonization strategies that include a 
phase-out of the use of fossil fuels by 2050, for which 
the WBGU proposes key milestones (Chapter 3).
 > The G20 should work to ensure the conservation or 
restoration of natural ecosystems so that natural car-
bon stocks (e.g. forests, peatlands) and the capability 
of the terrestrial biosphere to function as a sink are 
preserved. Land-use change and land-use manage-
ment should not only reflect climate protection crite-
ria; the entirety of the 2030 Agenda, i.e. all SDGs, 
should be considered.
 > The G20 should adopt a position on geoengineering. 
The WBGU advises that measures targeting the 
Earth’s radiation balance should not be pursued. It 
also advises against the large-scale alteration of the 
carbon cycle. Exceptions include the combining of 
bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) on a small scale as well 
as the chemical binding of CO2 from the air, both of 
which require additional research and testing.
 > The G20 should work towards establishing a binding 
and universal international legal framework for the 
‘if’ and ‘how’ of geoengineering measures. This 
framework should observe the precautionary 
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Figure 2 .4-1
Development of renewable energies. The growth of installed solar and wind energy capacities has far exceeded expectations, while 
costs have rapidly fallen: by 35% for wind energy and 86% for solar energy since 2000 (PV = photovoltaics).
Source: Trancik et al., 2015
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 principle while specifying moratoriums and liability 
regulations. The G20 should initiate this develop-
ment.
G20 states: Assuming a pioneering role in 
international climate policy
The particular responsibility of the G20 states should also 
find expression in their roles as parties to the UNFCCC 
and as signatories to the Paris Agreement. They could 
develop pioneering roles in the following three areas:
1. The current reduction promises – (Intended) Nation-
ally Determined Contributions: (I)NDC) – of the 
parties to the UNFCCC still lie well under the level 
required to implement the goals of the Paris Agree-
ment. The G20 states should move forward with 
highly ambitious reduction targets and implemen-
tation plans and improve their (I)NDCs accordingly. 
The G20 states should not only ambitiously formu-
late their climate protection contributions, but they 
should do so in accordance with comparable stand-
ards as well as monitoring and review processes.
2. In order to reach the Paris Agreement climate miti-
gation goals, the G20 states are tasked with devel-
oping decarbonization strategies in the four remain-
ing years before the Paris Agreement takes effect. 
This entails the formulation of concrete plans for the 
phase-out of fossil fuels as well as the development 
of roadmaps for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies by 
2020.
3. The G20 states should also send clear signals in the 
following areas:
•	The G20 states should formulate ambitious tar-
gets regarding the adaptation of their countries 
to climate change and adopt effective measures 
accordingly. They should work towards agreement 
on adaptation goals within the framework of the 
Paris Agreement.
•	The G20 states should advocate for strengthening 
the theme of ‘loss and damage’ within the UNFCCC 
and the Paris Agreement, above all by swiftly 
developing principles and regulations for compen-
sation obligations.
•	The issue of climate change-induced migration 
should be promoted by the G20 states. This should 
include providing assistance to environmental 
migrants and promoting their rights to protection 
within the framework of the UNFCCC, based on 
the principle of responsibility. 
•	In terms of financing, the G20 states can send 
strong signals through corresponding pledges, in 
particular by assuming costs for climate mitiga-
tion, the adaptation to climate change as well as 
for loss and damage. Discussion and development 
of a comprehensive system regulating liability for 
climate change-related damage and the enforce-
ment of such claims are necessary.
•	As a general measure, the WBGU recommends 
upgrading the theme of ‘urbanization and trans-
formation’ to a standing item on the G20 agenda 
(WBGU, 2016a). Germany’s G20 presidency 
should be used to place this theme firmly on the 
agenda. International policymakers’ weak reaction 
to Habitat III as an initial international implemen-
tation conference after the two world conferences 
2015 shows that the pending, massive boom in 
urbanization has not yet been anchored with ade-
quate prominence in the political agenda (WBGU, 
2016b; Pilardeaux et al., in press).
To summarize, in the coming years the G20 states will be 
required to assume a pioneering role in the Great Trans-
formation. This would also lead to  synergies with the 
implementation of the SDGs.
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Successfully implementing the 2030 Agenda and the 
Paris Agreement requires preparedness to cooperate 
internationally as well as the development and execution 
of effective national strategies, implementation road-
maps and instruments of transformative governance. 
G20 governments should campaign (1) to realign Inno-
vation so that it extends beyond the ‘G20 Blueprint on 
Innovative Growth’ (G20, 2016c) to enable economies 
and prosperity to develop within the planetary guard 
rails (WBGU, 2014b). They should (2) rapidly advance 
a climate-friendly and resource-efficient restructur-
ing of the global economy’s central Infrastructures. The 
G20 should promote (3) Investments that further the 
transformation towards sustainability. Infrastructures, 
investment and innovation are already essential ele-
ments of the G20 agenda. G20 countries should now 
link these to the principle of social Inclusion, which is at 
once a precondition and the goal of a successful trans-
formation of society towards sustainability and should 
guide all actions in this area. The principle of inclusion 
includes the dimension of social justice as well as those 
of social, cultural and political participation.
Only this re-balancing of the state, markets and civil 
society will make exacting sustainability and climate 
protection goals achievable (Figure 3-1). As described 
below, they will need a plausible, realistic, globally-co-
ordinated timetable (carbon roadmap, Section 3.2). Its 
framework would enable G20 member states to pursue 
individual national projects to open up new financing 
opportunities. One example of such a project are the 
new transformative sovereign wealth funds proposed by 
the WBGU (Section 3.3). To integrate civil society into 
this global initiative, all G20 countries will need a better 
‘transformative literacy’ as well as a general knowledge 
of and a narrative on the transformative policy possi-
bilities that are available and can be developed at the 
local, national and international level (Schneidewind, 
2013: 120).
3 .1
Re-balancing states, markets and civil society 
One essential prerequisite for achieving the SDGs is 
the orientation of political and government functions 
towards a viable future democratic polity with free civil 
societies and markets that are embedded in other social 
systems. To create these preconditions, the WBGU takes 
the view that the model of the proactive state, which has 
been suppressed in the economic deregulation and pri-
vatization of recent decades in many countries in favour 
of a ‘minimal state’ (Nozick, 1974), should be strength-
ened. The idea of a proactive state conveys “two aspects, 
frequently thought of as separate or contradicting: on 
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Figure 3-1
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the one hand empowering the state, which actively 
determines priorities and underlines them with clear sig-
nals, and on the other hand, giving citizens more exten-
sive opportunities to have a voice, to get involved in 
decision-making and to take a more active role in pol-
itics. [...] The proactive state is firmly anchored in the 
tradition of a liberal and constitutional democracy, but 
it develops this democracy further with a view towards 
the future sustainability of democratic communities and 
liberal civil societies.” (WBGU, 2011: 278). A proactive 
state and a free civil society are mutually dependent.
The debate conducted in the field of economic 
 sociology, and based on the ideas of the Hungarian eco-
nomic historian Karl Polanyi, postulates ‘re-embedding’ 
markets and market economies in society. Polanyi claimed 
that in the 19th century, markets and economic activi-
ties had ‘dis-embedded’ or disengaged themselves from 
the wider everyday life of society and that they would 
have to be ‘re-embedded’ if people’s freedoms, security 
and equality were to be ensured (Polanyi, 1944, 1968). 
His central idea is still being heard amid the increasingly 
loud criticism of some economically liberal notions of 
order. Today, with a global climate and sustainability pol-
icy on the agenda, economic globalization’s overall wel-
fare effect being questioned and a national-protectionist 
backlash that has arisen in response to it, an innovation 
in global governance institutions and national statehood 
is needed, which is where calls for ‘re-embedding’ mar-
ket economies and free trade become relevant.
By the 1970s, the paradigm of the 19th-century 
interventionist welfare state and New Deal period 
(1930–1975) had reached its limits because it could 
often only fulfil its diverse range of tasks by means of 
growing bureaucracies and debt, which encumbered fol-
lowing generations. As a result, essential public tasks 
were again increasingly left to the forces of market com-
petition and the model of the citizen was replaced by 
the model of the consumer in many areas. Scepticism 
about the ability of public policy (such as the ‘Washing-
ton Consensus’) to influence events became widespread 
and appeals to the common good, solidarity and justice 
no longer seemed to fit in with the times. 
In parallel to this withdrawal of the state (which is 
ongoing and entirely appropriate in some areas) and as 
a result of growing international economic, political and 
cultural interconnectedness, the belief that intervention 
in economic processes is necessary to ensure fairness, 
equality and solidarity has again gained ground. This has 
resulted in demands for more state involvement. Mean-
while, new tasks for governments have appeared on 
the agenda, such as international environmental policy, 
which became increasingly important with the growth of 
the environment movement and after the 1992 Rio Con-
ference. Protection of our natural life-support systems 
is anchored in the constitutional law of most G20 coun-
tries (Box 3.1-1). This has again changed how the state is 
viewed, with a move towards a more active and engaged 
government that can protect global public goods. To the 
classic tasks of government (public infrastructure and 
investment) have now been added the proactive state 
tasks of promoting social innovation and ensuring inclu-
sive development under the conditions of globalization 
(Messner, 1997). 
This report sets out concrete tasks for a proactive 
state in this area, with a carbon roadmap for implement-
ing the climate goals set in Paris and the 2030 Agenda. 
To implement the Paris Agreement in particular, disrup-
tive reforms must be carried out quickly if the emissions 
budget for achieving the 1.5°C goal is not to be used 
up in the next five years. G20 countries bear a special 
responsibility for doing this, which is explained in the 
following chapter.
Box 3 .1-1
Actively pursuing constitutional obligations to 
sustain the natural life-support systems 
A constitutional foundation for protecting global commons 
largely exists in all G20 states. The constitutions of 15 G20 
countries oblige them to preserve the natural life-support sys-
tems and thus to protect the climate. The other countries also 
recognize an obligation of the state to provide preservation 
and protection. Article 20a of the German Federal Constitution 
(GG) charges the German state, and especially German legis-
lators, also on behalf of future generations, with protecting 
natural life-support systems within the framework of constitu-
tional order. International opinion agrees unanimously that the 
concept of environmental assets requiring protection should be 
broadly interpreted and that climate is one such global public 
asset. Article 37 of the European Union Charta of Fundamen-
tal Rights stipulates an EU-wide obligation to ensure environ-
mental protection and environmentally friendly interpretation 
of EU and national law (Jarass, 2011). Only the constitutions 
of Australia, Canada and the U.S. do not contain these kinds of 
regulations (Boyd, 2012) although in the U.S. there are some 
similar provisions at the state level (UNEP, 2014: 4). Despite 
the absence of a constitutional  document, Great Britain also 
recognizes environmental protection as a national objective 
(Kloepfer and Mast, 1995: 116; Boyle, 2007: 10). The exist-
ence of a fundamental law governing environmental protec-
tion in the Japanese constitution is disputed, but at least argu-
able (Iwama, undated). 
Despite these constitutional obligations to protect the 
environment, the withdrawal of the state and privatization of 
public responsibilities have meant that many G20 countries 
have in recent decades failed to perform essential government 
environmental protection tasks, e.g. in the waste, water and 
energy sectors. G20 countries should make the public task of 
environmental and climate protection a priority that mirrors its 
constitutional standing and underpin it with effective instru-
ments, e.g. by establishing transformative sovereign wealth 
funds and decarbonising energy systems (Section 3.2).
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3 .2
Decadal carbon roadmap
To achieve the goal of keeping the global temperature 
well below 2°C, the WBGU, following the work of Rock-
ström et al. (in press), proposes below a ‘carbon road-
map’ that outlines, in decadal steps, the major changes 
necessary for implementing the Paris Agreement while 
excluding or minimising the use of high-risk technolo-
gies (Figure 3.2-3). This roadmap is a possible way to 
put the social contract needed for the Great Transforma-
tion into practice (WBGU, 2011) and outlines urgently 
required steps towards action. While the ‘Jürgen Schmid 
scenario’ (Box 3.2-1) focuses on the energy mix, the car-
bon roadmap is about concrete decisions by the world 
society. Unlike the Jürgen Schmid scenario, the road-
map includes the limited use of sustainable technolo-
gies for eliminating CO2 as a possible option during the 
second half of the century. Nevertheless, there is a need 
for swift action. The WBGU recommends that the G20 
rapidly implement the roadmap and in particular the 
first step, emphasizing four core strategies: (1) a com-
plete elimination of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use; 
(2) a rapid and major reduction in levels of other cli-
mate forcers (black carbon, methane, ozone precursors, 
etc.); (3) measures to protect and restore indispensable 
carbon stocks and natural sinks (e.g. tropical rainforests 
and boreal wetlands); (4) the development and deploy-
ment of sustainable technologies to remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere. 
2016–2020: No-brainers 
Expanding and improving proven instruments such as CO2 
taxes and trading systems, feed-in tariffs and quota sys-
tems will be of central importance by 2020. Energy effi-
ciency incentives should also be provided in the business 
and private sector to speed up progress. This includes the 
ending of all state subsidies for fossil fuels in G20 coun-
tries by 2020, with other countries quickly following suit. 
All the major cities and companies in industrialized coun-
tries should draw up a decarbonization strategy by 2020. 
By 2020, at least two dozen countries should designate 
a year in which they will finally stop using fossil fuels. 
Food production, which is a major source of greenhouse 
gases that also destroys natural carbon stocks, should be 
included in this strategy, e.g. through campaigns on eat-
ing fewer animal products and against food waste. This 
diverse range of reforms, which could be globally coor-
dinated, would enable the UNFCCC to play a new, cen-
tral role in the international community in coming years.
2020–2030: Herculean efforts 
By 2030, all countries should have phased out registra-
tion of new vehicles with combustion engines. Over this 
period, CO2 should be more heavily taxed, at around US$ 
30 per t CO2. This price should double every decade until 
it exceeds US$ 240 per t CO2 in 2060. All subsidies for 
fossil fuels (currently worth around US$ 500 billion per 
year; IEA, 2015c) should be channelled into investments 
in renewable energies. Public and private funding for 
sustainability-related research and development should 
have increased at least tenfold by 2030, compared with 
today. Core issues here include extending the durability 
of batteries and improving energy storage, alternative 
propulsion systems for aircraft, smart materials and new 
construction materials for cities, approaches towards 
creating sustainable lifestyles and concepts for sus-
tainable urbanization in polycentric structures (WBGU, 
2016a). Investments should be made in preserving and 
regenerating natural carbon stocks and sinks (e.g. the 
protection of natural ecosystems or sustainable forest 
management) and in the sustainable removal of CO2 
from the atmosphere (e.g. by using BECCS; Box 2.3-1) 
in order to remove up to 100 Mt of CO2 per year from 
the atmosphere. These investments should also help to 
further develop relevant technologies. 
2030–2040: Multiple breakthroughs 
As of 2030, all new urban quarters should be planned 
and built to generate more energy than they con-
sume. This could be achieved by building energy-plus 
houses that both recycle energy (e.g. through waste 
water heat recovery) and produce energy (e.g. in photo-
voltaic plants). All fluctuating energy sources should 
have a minimum storage rate of 90%. Energy trans-
port should be optimized by the use of superconductive 
cables, including in countries outside the OECD. Floating 
and flying renewable energy technologies should also 
make major contribution to energy supplies, especially 
in countries with limited space for ‘traditional’ renew-
able energy technologies (e.g. Japan). Some examples of 
these are solar platforms on lakes and wind power tech-
nologies that use kites and gliders at various heights to 
produce wind energy. Roads and streets should become 
self-contained mobile infrastructures that supply drive 
power and minimize friction. One promising develop-
ment in this context are super-robust surface materials 
where renewable power is transmitted to vehicles via 
electromagnetic induction. In the construction sector, 
materials such as concrete and steel should be replaced 
by climate-friendly substances such as timber, clay and 
stone, supported by high-tech components made of 
materials such as carbon fibre. The amount of CO2 elimi-
nated from the atmosphere should be doubled by means 
of extensive reforestation and a limited, sustainable use 
of BECCS (Box 2.3-1). 
2040–2050: Revisions and reinforcements 
The successes of recent decades should be reinforced and 
any failures corrected. Most European countries aim to 
have their economies decarbonized by the 2040s. The 
American and Asian continents should be close to this 
goal at the end of that decade. Natural gas will still be 
used to a limited extent, but it will be CO2-neutral due to 
advanced CCS technology (Matter et al., 2016). Removal 
of CO2 from the atmosphere will be continued within the 
limits outlined in Box 2.3-1.
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Box 3 .2-1
A vision of a renewable energy system based on 
the ideas of Jürgen Schmid
The following scenario further develops a vision for a  global 
regenerative energy system by 2050 that was presented 
in 2011 (WBGU, 2011: 129) and is published by the WBGU 
in memoriam Jürgen Schmid, who, as a WBGU member, 
 contributed substantially to drafting it. 
To answer the question of how global warming can be kept 
well below 2 °C or even 1.5°C, various scenarios have been 
developed since the Paris conference that will also be incor-
porated into the special report on 1.5°C that the IPCC has 
been commissioned with drafting. A transformation of energy 
infrastructure like the one described in Section 3.2 is only pos-
sible with profound changes to framework conditions that are 
not currently extant. So far, the vast majority of the scenarios 
presented have overused the permissible emissions budget and 
complied with it later by introducing net negative emissions. 
If current scenarios assume however, that a faster transforma-
tion is not possible, political and legal frameworks will also be 
designed to accommodate only a gradual transformation. 
The WBGU therefore presents below a scenario (Sterner 
and Bauer, 2016) that deliberately forgoes all options regard-
ed as risky (e.g. geoengineering). This scenario is designed to 
stimulate readers to question the scenarios and climate mitiga-
tion programmes being currently developed and examine the 
plausibility of the speed of the conversion that they assume. 
This scenario removes coal from the system as quickly as 
possible, by 2030, (Figure 3.2-1). Oil use is gradually reduced, 
although at a slower rate because it is harder to completely 
replace in the short term. Gas, in contrast, is used as a bridging 
technology by 2050. It can be seen that the use of all fossil 
fuels, due to their subsidization, initially declines very grad-
ually, then falls at a steeper rate to zero in 2050. The use of 
renewable energies moves in the opposite direction to fossil 
fuel use. Biomass is expanded up to its technical potential and 
remains at this level until 2035, because it is a CO2-neutral 
option for balancing out fluctuations and is readily available 
in the short term. After that, it declines linearly until in 2050 
and, apart from residual materials, completely disappears out 
of the energy mix, allowing the construction materials sector 
to access its available sustainable potential. In this ambitious 
scenario, hydropower and marine energy will also be need-
ed to the limits of their sustainable potential, which is fully 
exploited as of 2025. Global primary energy demand reaches 
its maximum of 542 EJ in 2020, after which it falls to 402 EJ 
in 2050. For this scenario it is assumed that efficiency meas-
ures will enable global demand for heating and cooling to be 
kept fairly constant, and that growth in final energy demand 
for transport and global growth in the demand for power can 
be limited to 1% per year. This could be achieved through a 
series of measures, including improving building insulation, 
using heat pumps, measures to improve efficiency in industry, 
and extreme improvements in efficiencies in the area of energy 
conversion (electromobility, renewable electricity generation). 
For the transport sector, transforming primary energy demand 
means that, as of 2030, no new combustion engines can be 
allowed into the system and that they completely disappear 
by 2050, as they are gradually replaced by electromobility and 
power-to-gas.
This scenario describes the possibility of a rapid restructur-
ing of energy infrastructure. Figure 3.2-2 shows the emissions 
that this scenario would entail. The carbon roadmap outlined 
in Section 3.2 specifies the concrete actions needed to achieve 
this restructuring in decadal steps. In contrast to the carbon 
roadmap, the scenario deliberately dispenses with negative 
emissions to emphasize that this option, which involves major 
uncertainties, can be dispensed with if immediate and ambi-
tious action is taken. If, despite all efforts, energy infrastruc-
ture cannot be transformed in time, it would be possible to 
fall back on sustainable technologies to eliminate CO2 from the 
atmosphere to a limited extent (Box 2.3-1). This is why these 
technology options and further concrete steps for action for 
implementing the Paris Agreement are included in the carbon 
roadmap (Section 3.2).
Figure 3 .2-1
The Jürgen Schmid scenario: a vision of a global renewable energy system by 2050. It shows the distribution of global 
primary energy needs by energy source. The simulation aims to cover global final energy demand while at the same time 
limiting cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use to 660 Gt and the reduction of emissions to zero by 2050.
Source: Sterner and Bauer, 2016 
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The global decadal carbon roadmap will require Inno-
vation, Investment and improved Infrastructure and 
can only succeed through Inclusion. The latter issue 
should factor into all measures necessary for  influencing 
 Innovation, Investment and Infrastructure, and ade-
quate compensation may have to be provided to ensure 
that transformation goals are not achieved at the cost 
of increasing inequality. Despite the technical nature 
of the carbon roadmap’s approaches to solutions in the 
discourse on achieving climate protection goals, the 
WBGU advocates taking a systemic view and compre-
hensively taking into account not only effects on cli-
mate systems, but also the ecological, economic, political 
and socio-cultural risks and side effects. Predominantly 
technical solutions or a mainly technical perspective run 
the risk of overlooking a range of possible opportunities 
as well as negative consequences and risks while creat-
ing irreversible path dependencies. 
3 .3
Transformative sovereign wealth funds for a 
sustainable future
Structural changes and new powerful policy instruments 
will be required if the SDGs and goals set in the Paris 
Agreement are to be achieved and the proposed carbon 
roadmap (Section 3.2) implemented. The WBGU pro-
poses that to do this, the G20 countries should estab-
lish ‘future funds’ – national, transformative sovereign 
wealth funds financed through a sustainability levy. This 
levy should consist of a progressive estate tax, CO2 taxes 
and revenues from emissions trading. The future funds 
would manage the money on behalf of the national gov-
ernment and invest it in the financial market in indus-
tries key to the transformation, so as to accelerate it and 
overcome ‘CO2 dependency’. At the same time, divi-
dends from the future funds should be used to provide 
social and structural policy support for the transforma-
tion to a sustainable economic and social system. 
By establishing future funds, G20 countries could 
open up new scope for government action. States would 
1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100
Ca
rb
on
 fl
ux
 [G
t C
O 2
 /y
ea
r]
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
em
iss
io
ns
 [G
t C
O 2
 ]
-4,000
-3,000
-2,000
-1,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
Ocean
Land
Natural gas
Oil
Coal
Atmosphere
Year
Cumulative emissionsLand-use change
Cement
Figure 3 .2-2
The emissions generated in the Jürgen Schmid scenario (Figure 3.2-1) and resulting changes in the carbon cycle. CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels, cement production and changes to land use by 2050 (left axis, figures > 0 are CO2 sources) are 
absorbed by the atmosphere, land and ocean (left axis, figures < 0 are CO2 sinks). After anthropogenic emissions fall to zero 
in about 2050, CO2 from the atmosphere is still transferred into the land and ocean (Section 2.3); the atmosphere is then 
shown in the graph as a source. The red line shows cumulative CO2 emissions, which stabilize after 2050 (right axis). The 
emissions development in this scenario provides grounds for the expectation of a temperature increase limited to well below 
2 °C (Section 2.2).
Sources: IIASA, based on calculations carried out using the MAGICC climate model (Meinshausen et al., 2011), based on data 
from Sterner and Bauer, 2016 (CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels) and RCP 2.6 (CO2 emissions land-use change). For 
CO2 emissions from cement production, a linear decrease to zero by 2050 was assumed for the sake of simplicity.
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have a more powerful presence as investors in interna-
tional financial markets and be able to help accelerate 
national and global transformation processes by linking 
investments to strategic, long-term sustainability and 
climate protection goals, such as the 2°C guard rail, and 
increasing investment in related industries key to the 
transformation (e.g. storage technologies, electromobil-
ity or climate-friendly building materials).  Proprietary 
rights from the shares held could be used to exert a 
stronger influence on company decisions in favour of 
sustainability aspects. Sovereign wealth funds also offer 
an opportunity to act where private investors have so far 
held back because of their shorter-term profit expecta-
tion horizons and the financial system’s incentive struc-
tures. The investment strategy of future funds should be 
oriented towards strong, long-range financing and earn-
ing profits for the long term.
The steering effect that G20 countries could have on 
international capital flows by establishing future funds 
(Element 1  in Figure 3.3-1) would increase with the 
funds’ volumes, which would be continuously built up 
in subsequent decades. To accelerate and scale up the 
transformation while the funds are being established 
and to accommodate international climate equality, only 
around 30% of the revenues from CO2 taxes and emis-
sions trading should flow directly into the future funds. 
40% of the revenues from CO2 taxes and emissions 
trading should be used to support direct, project-based 
investment, especially in climate-friendly infrastruc-
tures, or to mobilize private investment by reducing 
investment risks (e.g. de-risking) ( Element 3  in  Figure 
3.3-1). The first is already occurring in Germany (on a 
small scale) through the government’s  Special Energy 
and Climate Fund. G20 governments should use the 
remaining 30% of the revenues from CO2 taxes and 
emissions trading to help developing countries to pro-
tect the climate and adapting to changes (Element 4  in 
Figure 3.3-1). This could be done through bilateral coop-
erative climate projects or the Green Climate Fund.
Returns from the future funds (Box 3.3-1) could 
be used to finance measures that, although essential 
to the success of the transformation, are not economi-
cally profitable, so no private investor would be actively 
involved in them. Such measures could include action on 
structural change and support for the ‘losers of change’, 
e.g. fossil energy industry employees, to prevent or min-
imize social upheaval or dispel resistance to the trans-
formation resulting from such upheavals. Although 
the energy sector’s conversion to renewable energies is 
expected to result in a net increase in jobs (ILO, 2012), 
some regions, especially mono-industrial regions, will 
experience substantial job losses, which could plunge 
them into long-term crisis (ILO, 2012; Haywood, 2016). 
Along with national measures to reduce inequality, 
regional political measures will be required to provide 
social and structural political support for the transfor-
mation (Element 2  in Figure 3.3-1). 
Along with the future funds’ investment strategy, 
their governance structures will be of central impor-
tance. The principles of Norway’s pension funds offer 
orientation for the future funds’ institutional struc-
ture (Statens pensjonsfond utland; such as high levels 
of transparency, compliance with ethical guidelines and 
prevention of political influence through low levels of 
average share ownership; Velculescu, 2008). These gov-
ernance structures should ensure economic efficiency 
by including elements important to the legitimization of 
the funds, such as participatory management (through 
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Carbon roadmap for stepwise decadal decarbonization. The emissions shown are based on the Jürgen Schmid scenario (Box 3.2-1). 
The blue squares indicate decadal steps to be taken by 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050, which should result in a decarbonization by 
the middle of the century. 
Source: WBGU, based on Rockström et al., in press; Sterner and Bauer, 2016
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discussion of the investment strategy in parliament), 
transparency (through publication of the investment 
strategy and investment decision) and an obligation to 
contribute to the common good. Taking participative ele-
ments into account could also help to make financial and 
economic power more democratic (Corneo, 2015). 
Generating funding: combining climate protection 
and equity 
Sovereign wealth funds in practice often draw on rev-
enues from the sale of resources, especially from oil 
and gas. In contrast, levying means for the future funds 
should aim to have a climate-friendly steering effect: 
current emissions should be priced by means of CO2 
taxes and revenues from emissions trading, and histor-
ical and accumulated CO2 emissions through an inher-
itance tax as a generational component (in the form of 
an estate tax). These taxes take into account the pollut-
er-pays principle and its associated historical responsibil-
ity principle. The funds would be used in the interests of 
future generations, so they also involve responsibility for 
the future. A progressive estate tax would also promote 
social equity between current and future generations, by 
counteracting existing wealth inequalities and ensuring 
more equal baseline conditions. The WBGU regards an 
estate tax – in combination with CO2 taxes and proceeds 
from emissions trading – as a sustainability levy that can 
be used to tackle the core concerns of the 2030 Agenda.
Production processes in almost all countries are cur-
rently based mainly on high-emission energy sources, 
although in 2014 the global economy grew for the first 
time without increasing global carbon dioxide output 
from energy use (IEA, 2015b). Carbon pricing already 
exists in 40 countries at the national level and in another 
24 sub-national jurisdictions (e.g. American states and 
Chinese cities). Existing systems, however, cover only 
7 Gt CO2eq, or around 13% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions (World Bank, 2016b: 22 f.). There are other 
taxes, such as Germany’s mineral oil tax, with a steer-
ing effect like that of CO2 pricing, but the rates levied on 
the various energy sources (petrol, diesel) are not nec-
essarily linked with the carbon content of those energy 
Figure 3 .3-1
Elements of the future funds. This kind of transformative sovereign wealth fund, which every G20 country should establish, links 
its investment strategy to long-term sustainability and climate goals and invests in key industries that will be essential to the 
transformation (Element 1 ), helping to close gaps in financing for the transformation. Dividends from the future funds should 
be used nationally to provide social and structural political support for the transformation (Element 2 ). The future funds would 
be drawn from an estate tax (this kind of tax is levied on the entire estate, in contrast to the situation in which the tax is levied 
on the share of the recipient, e.g. in Germany) and some of the revenues from CO2 pricing (CO2 taxes or emissions trading). 30% 
of revenues from CO2 pricing should flow into the future funds, 40% should be used for project-based investments in domestic 
climate-friendly infrastructures and to mobilize private capital (e.g. de-risking), to accelerate the transformation immediately and 
not wait until the future funds have reached a relevant volume (Element 3 ), and another 30% should be used for cooperative 
international climate projects (Element 4 ).
Source: WBGU
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Box 3 .3-1
Illustration of the estimated volume of the 
German future fund 
Low-level ambition
A 2020 price of US$ 30 per t CO2, which subsequently doubles 
every decade, could earn Germany annual revenues  averaging 
around € 18 billion between 2020 and 2050. This revenue 
stems from CO2 taxes and auctioning certificates within the 
framework of European emissions trading (EU ETS) for CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels and industrial emissions (CO2, N2O, 
FKW). The annual revenues would increase from around € 13 
billion in 2020 to € 22 billion in 2036, and then fall again until 
they drop to zero in 2050 due to decarbonization. Decreasing 
quantities of emissions and increasing CO2 prices largely offset 
each other, so there would be relatively stable revenue volumes 
until decarbonization.
In keeping with the structure of the future funds  suggested 
by the WBGU and the proposed distribution of revenues 
from CO2 taxes and proceeds from emissions trading (Figure 
3.3-2), an average of around € 5.3 billion for the future funds, 
€ 7.1 billion for project-based investments and € 5.3 billion for 
cooperative international climate protection projects would be 
available annually.
With a target figure of 10 % of inheritance and gift volumes 
for the generational component, an additional amount of € 20 
billion per year would become available for the future fund in 
Germany. With the sum of the generational component (estate 
tax) and around € 5.3 billion from CO2 pricing, the fund would 
grow to € 278 billion between 2020 and the end of 2030. 
Based on an annual rate of return of 4%, there would be an 
annual dividend of around € 1 billion in 2020, which would 
rise to € 11 billion in 2030 (Table 3.3-1). 
High-level ambition
Given a target figure of 20% of inheritance and gift volumes 
for the generational component and a CO2 price that rises from 
US$ 40 in 2020 to US$ 80 in 2030, the volume of the future 
fund at the end of 2030 would be around € 517 billion and the 
dividend around € 21 billion. In this scenario, an annual aver-
age of about € 9.5 billion would be available for project-based 
investment and € 7.1 billion for cooperative  international 
climate projects. A further annual average of € 7.1 billion 
would flow from CO2 pricing into in the future fund.
These estimates are based on data from Germany’s National 
Inventory Report on emissions from the energy and industrial 
sectors (UBA, 2015) and information from the German Emis-
sions Trading Authority on Germany’s share of emissions under 
the EU ETS in 2020. Like the carbon roadmap (Section 3.2), 
Figure 3 .3-2
German future fund: average potential revenue from CO2 taxes, emissions trading and inheritance tax in the period from 2020–
2050 for Germany. The information is based on a target generational component figure of 10% and a CO2 price of US$ 30 per 
t CO2 in 2020, which doubles in each following decade (low-level ambition). Revenues from CO2 taxes and emissions trading 
in this period (2020–2050) amount to an average of approx. € 18 billion per year, revenues from inheritance tax approx. € 20 
billion. The fund would grow from € 24 billion in 2020 to € 781 billion in 2050. For international climate cooperation projects, 
an average of approx. € 5.3 billion per year would be available, for direct investment and mobilising private capital, this figure 
would be € 7.1 billion per year. With a dividend of 4 % in the period 2020–2050, average revenues would be € 17 billion per 
year for providing social and structural political support for the transformation. Starting at € 1.0 billion in 2020, the dividend 
would grow to € 31 billion in 2050.
Source: WBGU
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Transformative sovereign wealth funds for a sustainable future 3.3
sources. The OECD regards CO2 taxes and revenues from 
emissions trading, together with other taxes and levies 
on energy and industrial processes, as a single ‘effec-
tive CO2 price’ (OECD, 2016). This is especially high in 
the transport sector, which has nearly no CO2 taxes, but 
has other taxes and levies that are comparatively high.
The CO2 price varies greatly in different CO2 tax and 
emissions trading systems, ranging from less than US$ 1 
per t CO2 in Japan up to US$ 131 per t CO2 in Sweden (for 
emissions not covered by the European emissions trad-
ing system EU ETS). For 75% of the emissions subject to 
global pricing, the price is under US$ 10 per t CO2 (World 
Bank, 2016b: 11). When taking into account direct and 
indirect subsidies for fossil fuels, which were worth US$ 
4,900 billion in 2013 (Coady et al., 2015), the average 
CO2 price for fossil sources is in fact negative. In 2013, 
every tonne of CO2 attracted a US$ 150 subsidy (Eden-
hofer, 2015). 
Many of the scenarios evaluated by the IPCC that 
are compatible with the 2°C guard rail assume that the 
average global price will be around US$ 50 per t CO2 
by 2020, and rise to about US$ 90 per t CO2 by 2030 
(Clarke et al., 2014: 450). To achieve the steering effects 
required to reach the 1.5°C goal, these prices will have 
to be much higher (Rogelj et al., 2015: 525). In almost 
all models, however, the CO2 price is the only steering 
element. Other regulatory measures, such as a politi-
cal decision to opt out of coal-fired power generation, 
regardless of how high the CO2 price is, are not taken 
into account. It can therefore be assumed that a suffi-
ciently strong transformation can be achieved even with 
a lower CO2 price, if it is flanked by further measures 
(Bertram et al., 2015).
G20 countries generate 82% of global CO2 emissions 
(IEA, 2015a), so they have a special responsibility to 
ensure that there is adequately high comprehensive CO2 
pricing worldwide. Where this is not yet the case, the 
WBGU recommends that G20 countries introduce CO2 
pricing through CO2 taxes or emissions trading systems 
for CO2 emissions from fossil energy sources and indus-
trial processes. They should also ensure that CO2 prices 
reach at least US$ 30 per t CO2 in 2020 and then double in 
decadal steps (Section 3.2). To maximize the effect of this 
pricing, both instruments – the levying of CO2 taxes and 
emissions trading – should be coordinated as far as possi-
ble. A coordinated approach by G20  countries to increase 
CO2 prices would reduce distortions in  competition. 
If the G20 pursues the direction the WBGU recom-
they assume a linear reduction in current CO2 emissions to zero 
by 2050 and an auction rate under the EU ETS rising from 80% 
in 2020 to 90% in 2027. They also take into account the fact 
that only 88% of the proceeds from auctions would remain in 
Germany, with 12% going to the EU. It is also assumed that 
not all emissions outside the EU ETS can be subject to taxes, so 
only 90% of the emissions were taken into account. 
The estate tax is based on the lower inheritance and gift 
 volume in Germany, as estimated by Bach and Thiemann 
(2016), which corresponds to € 200 billion per year. For the 
sake of simplicity, it was assumed that inheritance and gift 
volumes would remain constant in the period between 2020 
and 2050.
The triad of CO2 taxes, emissions trading and estate taxes, 
and current and past CO2 emissions can be drawn on equal-
ly to build a powerful transformation instrument that could 
also reduce existing assets inequality, if inheritance reform is 
structured to be progressive. This would benefit future gen-
erations in two ways: first, through investment in sustainable 
structures and preservation of the natural foundations of life; 
and second, by strengthening social justice by counteracting 
ongoing current economic inequality.  
Table 3.3-1
German future fund. Estimates of revenues from CO2 taxes, emissions trading and estate tax, and the fund’s volume and the 
dividends expected for the decades from 2020 to 2050. Estimates are based on two different levels of ambition for building 
up the volume of the fund.
Source: WBGU
Year CO2 taxes and 
emissions trading 
[€ billion]
Estate tax 
[€ billion]
Volume of the  
future fund 
[€ billion]
Dividend 
[€ billion]
Low-level ambition: Target figure for estate tax: 10%; CO2 price in 2020: US$ 30 per t
2020 14 20   24  1.0
2030 21 20  278 11 
2040 21 20  543 22
2050  0 20  781 31
High-level ambition: Target figure for estate tax: 20%; CO2 price in 2020: US$ 40 per t
2020 17 40  45  1.8
2030 28 40  517 21 
2040 28 40 1,005 40
2050  0 40 1,454 58
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mends, it should recommend to the EU that it harmonize 
CO2 taxing and further develop the EU emissions trad-
ing system (EU ETS), orienting it towards the G20 strat-
egy for setting a CO2 price. CO2 pricing measures by indi-
vidual governments would only distort competition and 
may breach primary laws (Article 34 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union; Free Movement of 
Goods). The EU Commission made a practical and expe-
dient proposal in this context in 2011 (EU Commission, 
2011), which envisaged amending the Energy Taxation 
Directive (EU, 2003) for this purpose and aimed to abol-
ish the privileged status of fossil energy usage, especially 
tax incentives for energy-intensive companies, privilege 
electricity generation from renewable energy sources 
and coordinate CO2 pricing with the EU  ETS, particu-
larly regarding the taxation of energy use in areas not 
 covered by the EU ETS. 
CO2 taxes or emissions trading systems can only price 
current emissions, yet CO2 builds up in the atmosphere, 
so current global warming is also the result of accu-
mulated historical emissions. Economic development 
has historically been accompanied by an intensive use 
of fossil energies, and thus by CO2 emissions. In keep-
ing with the polluter-pays principle, highly developed, 
prosperous states are the main generators of climate 
change and should bear most of the costs for preventing 
and adapting to it. Various proposals made at the inter-
national level for sharing the historical burden among 
countries (e.g. the ‘Brazilian Proposal’: La Rovere et al., 
2002, or the WBGU’s budget approach (2009b)) have 
not yet resulted in international agreements. 
As well as an overall responsibility of national econ-
omies for historical emissions, the WBGU has identified 
an individual responsibility for them, because positive 
economic development in industrialized and more pros-
perous emerging economies has resulted not only in a 
high level of national development, but in the accumu-
lation of private capital. The individual assets acquired 
during industrialization and in the 20th century, espe-
cially during the post-war economic boom, were accu-
mulated by way of fossil energy use. The WBGU takes 
the view that taxing these assets would be an appropri-
ate instrument for pricing accumulated historical emis-
sions. 
The WBGU suggests that G20 countries should intro-
duce a generational component on individual assets in 
the form of a progressive inheritance tax on estates 
(estate tax). To achieve greater sustainability and pre-
serve the natural foundations of life for future genera-
tions, it is both ethical and necessary to transfer assets 
not just privately to our own descendants, but to use 
them to contribute to a shared future (Atkinson, 2016; 
Beckert, 2004). Different population groups have prof-
ited to varying extents from past economic growth, and 
in affluent OECD countries and large emerging econ-
omies such as Russia, China and South Africa, income 
and wealth inequality has increased sharply in recent 
decades ( Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). To balance out the 
social costs of this accumulation of assets, such as more 
fragile social stability and inequality in people’s oppor-
tunities and prospects, there have been many calls for 
a greater openness to reallocation measures (Ostry et 
al., 2016). An estate tax would be one appropriate way 
of taking such measures. In contrast to inheritance tax, 
which is levied on the assets inherited by an individual 
heir (e.g. in  Germany), estate taxes are levied on the value 
of the entire estate (e.g. in the U.S. and UK). Depend-
ing on the number of heirs and their relationship to the 
testator, inheritance tax can result in assets of the same 
value being subject to very different effective tax rates, 
possibly imposing an unequal tax burden in the context 
of historical ecological responsibility. In countries that 
already have an inheritance tax (such as Germany) both 
models could be combined. 
An effectively structured estate tax in combination 
with a gift tax offers comprehensive financing potential 
(IMF, 2013). Over recent decades, the volumes of inher-
itances and gifts has increased significantly as a propor-
tion of GDP in highly developed countries. However, tax 
revenues in countries that levy taxes on inheritance and 
gifts are usually low, because high tax exemption limits 
and special regulations on tax avoidance substantially 
reduce the national tax base (IMF, 2013). 
Germany’s inheritance and gift volume is estimated 
at € 200–300 billion per year, of which € 30–40 billion 
comes from corporate bequests. The volume of the larg-
est 1.5% of inheritances makes up around one-third of 
all assets bequeathed in Germany (Bach and Thiemann, 
2016). Annual revenues from inheritance tax are worth 
around € 5 billion. High tax exemption limits (up to 
€ 500,000) for private asset bequests and comprehen-
sive exemptions for company assets in Germany mean 
that many German estates are bequeathed almost tax-
free. 
The WBGU proposes structuring the inheritance tax 
so that 10–20% of national inheritance and gift volume 
would go into financing the future funds. For the Ger-
man future funds, this would result in annual potential 
revenue of at least € 20 billion for a target figure of 10% 
or at least € 40 billion for a target figure of 20%. The 
money should go directly to the funds or, if there are 
legal restrictions, flow into the government budget as a 
reciprocal financing model. In this case, the state should 
undertake to fill the funds with a share of the annual tax 
revenues. Only the latter would be possible in Germany 
for constitutional reasons.
Introducing an estate tax – also in combination with 
the existing inheritance tax – should be admissible under 
the German constitution, but would face major political 
challenges. Under Article 106 Paragraph 2 of the  German 
constitution, the German federal states are entitled to 
inheritance and gift tax revenues, so the sixteen federal 
states would have to be willing to use the proceeds from 
inheritance and gift taxes for the purposes of the trans-
formation or for a sovereign wealth fund dedicated to 
achieving transformation goals. 
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3 .4
Strengthening participatory democracy for the 
transformation
A lasting and inclusive project for modernization, equity 
and peace should include civil society in its design and 
implementation. 
 > Innovation often emerges in social niches and through 
social learning processes (WBGU, 2011; Messner, 
2016). Its potential can best be developed when the 
society is open to diversity and niche groups are well 
connected with wider social groups.
 > Environmentally friendly infrastructure can only be 
built up at the required speed and with the necessary 
consistency if it is supported by civil society and not 
blocked by resistance.
 > G20 governments will only be able to procure the 
necessary investment with support from non-state 
investors that are accepted by the wider society.
The concept of a new, proactive state described above 
centres on equity, participation and quality of life while 
focusing on the promoting of “quality of life for all” 
(Stiglitz et al., 2010; EU Commission, 2009). A proac-
tive state is embedded in a vigilant civil society, whose 
people see themselves not as passive observers of gov-
ernment action and social developments, but as ‘citi-
zens’, responsible members of the public actively partic-
ipating in networked societies (Messner, 1997). In the 
willingness of national and international civil society 
to take responsibility for climate mitigation, which has 
grown in recent years (WBGU, 2014a), the WBGU sees 
an opportunity for citizens to develop a broad ‘trans-
formative literacy’, the ability to “adequately under-
stand transformation processes in their many dimen-
sions and bring their own activities to bear in transfor-
mation processes” (Schneidewind, 2013: 120). This does 
not relieve the state of its responsibility to persuade cit-
izens of the necessity of the transformation, but opens 
up possibilities for shaping this communication with and 
through civil society.
Inclusive communication about the causes and 
consequences of climate change 
In a proactive state, the discourse on the sustainabil-
ity and climate goals agreed upon in New York and Paris 
is not conducted only among experts. Involving soci-
eties sufficiently in this discourse will require an ade-
quate communication of climate problems and climate 
goals, including a realistic evaluation of the possible 
risks, effects and side effects of the various options for 
action. The great complexity and abstractness of sys-
temic interconnections pose major challenges for the 
communication of options for climate mitigation action. 
Even in countries with good education systems, popula-
tions do not well understand risks or conditional prob-
abilities related to risk factors (‘statistical illiteracy’: 
Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2011). To this issue is added 
the  phenomenon of the ‘illusion of certainty’, a term 
from risk research (Hertwig, 2013; Gigerenzer, 2008). In 
our modern, technically engineered world, people like 
to believe that risks can be completely controlled. They 
think in linear, often mono-causal contexts, overrate 
the effective power of technologies, prefer simple solu-
tions and underestimate possible negative consequences 
(Renn, 2008).
Involving civil society in a discourse on the options 
for acting within the framework of sustainability policy 
is therefore an education project as well. Experiences 
and discoveries made in the area of climate protection 
could help people understand the general dynamic of 
processes of change in their many dimensions, with-
out making them feel powerless as individual actors. To 
develop a basic ‘transformative literacy’, collective and 
individual abilities to deal productively and creatively 
with challenges should be promoted so that the uncer-
tainties and fears that accompany any confrontation 
with complex and unusual tasks can be diminished. In 
this context, it is important to always link information 
on risks with collective and individual options for action 
(Rogers, 1975, 1983). 
Enabling people to develop solidarity-based lifestyles 
Achieving the goal of complete decarbonization requires 
a change to our concept of quality of life, which is linked 
with resource-intensive forms of consumption in many 
socio-cultural circles (Schneidewind and Zahrnt, 2013). 
The WBGU, in coining the term ‘solidarity-based qual-
ity of life’ has proposed a model designed to open up a 
discourse space for a social dialogue on how to create 
a sustainable quality of life (WBGU, 2016a: 144 f.). In 
particular, it is designed to sound out options for estab-
lishing an individual quality of life that is not lived at a 
cost to present and future generations and their oppor-
tunities for fulfilment (Nanz and Leggewie, 2015). The 
WBGU is of the opinion that a comprehensive notion of 
the individual as someone whose role as private con-
sumer is not artificially separated from the role of cit-
izen could make an essential contribution to this dis-
course. The prevailing discourse on the modifiability of 
lifestyles is based on an undifferentiated understand-
ing of human action, which regards decisions on con-
sumption as exclusively oriented towards individual 
benefit, although people base decisions to act on stand-
ards and values that do not directly serve their own self- 
interest (Messner and Weinlich, 2016; Steg, 2016; Stern, 
2000). There remains the question of under which con-
textual conditions an individual’s own standards can be 
applied to their actions, and how the various forms of 
political consumption (Thoresen et al., 2015; Soper and 
 Trentman, 2008) can be more effectively encouraged. 
To create incentives and structures for changing 
lifestyles and consumer behaviour, the WBGU recom-
mends taking a differentiated view of the modifiabil-
ity of behaviour. From a systemic point of view, human 
thinking and acting are embedded in diverse contexts. 
Supporting this change requires that equal attention 
be paid to structural interdependencies (infrastruc-
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tural restrictions, but also cultural forces) as to the 
degrees of individual freedom and windows of opportu-
nity for change. Structure-focused top-down strategies 
(such as regulations and incentives) should be deployed 
where the greatest possible effect on the reduction of 
resources and energy consumption can be expected (in 
north-western Europe this would be the areas of mobil-
ity or interior heating). To make use of existing poten-
tial to develop conscious, solidarity-based lifestyles, 
G20 countries should also support top-down approaches 
as well as bottom-up processes in ‘ecologically minded 
milieus’. Although their ecological footprint is still fairly 
large, these milieus often have the resources required to 
be effective through strategic consumption or targeted 
divestment. In this sense, G20 governments should 
support ‘pioneers of change’ (WBGU, 2011) and the 
socio-ecological innovation they are proposing and 
propagating (e.g. actors in the collaborative economy, 
eco-villages and transition towns; WBGU, 2014a).
3 .5
Recommendations
To bring about the necessary transformations quickly 
enough to keep global warming well under 2°C and 
implement the 2030 Agenda goals, the WBGU recom-
mends that the G20 countries implement the following 
measures: 
 > The G20 states should revise their current (I)NDCs in 
light of the agreements made in Paris, develop decar-
bonization strategies to implement them and orient 
their efforts towards the decadal steps in the carbon 
roadmap, in which global emissions are reduced to 
zero by 2050. As a first step, an emissions peak must 
be reached and subsidies for fossil energy sources in 
the G20 be abolished by 2020. 
 > In setting up future funds (transformative sovereign 
wealth funds) G20 countries should become more 
active as actors in financial markets with the goal of 
advancing socially responsible structural change and 
creating a sustainable economic and social system. 
The future funds should be filled (1) through the 
pricing of current and historical CO2 emissions. They 
should (2) align the investments with climate change 
targets and the SDGs while also using ownership 
rights to this end, and (3) use the dividends to 
enhance the common good and improve equity. Some 
of the revenues from CO2 taxes and emissions trading 
should be directly invested in individual projects or 
used to mobilize private investment (e.g. de-risking), 
so that states do not wait for the funds to reach a 
critical size, but start working immediately to create 
sustainable infrastructure. A further share of this 
revenue should flow directly into cooperative inter-
national climate projects and benefit developing 
countries.
 > To produce the steering effect necessary for the 
transformation and generate the financial resources 
needed for the future funds, the G20 countries should 
introduce a system for pricing CO2 emissions from 
fossil energy sources and industrial processes where 
they are not yet priced, either through CO2 taxes or 
emissions trading systems. They should ensure that 
the price is oriented towards the carbon content of 
the specific energy source and that a minimum price 
of US$ 30 per t CO2 – a target considered to be essen-
tial – is reached by 2020 and then doubles in every 
following decade. 
 > To finance the future funds, the WBGU also recom-
mends that the G20 countries introduce a genera-
tional component in the form of a progressive estate 
tax (which taxes all the assets in an estate instead of 
the shares of individual heirs in the inheritance). The 
tax should be structured so that 10–20% of national 
inheritance and gift volume is available for financing 
the future funds.
 > In implementing the transformation, the G20 states 
should make use of regulatory top-down strategies as 
well as knowledge-based, motivational, bottom-up 
approaches. The G20 governments should more 
actively support ‘pioneers of change’ (WBGU, 2011) 
and the social and ecological innovations they pro-
pose and propagate.
 > The G20 countries should take advantage of national 
and international civil society’s increasing willingness 
to take responsibility for climate protection (WBGU, 
2014a) and promote a widespread ‘transformative 
literacy’ among their citizens.
 > The G20 states should grant the public task of envi-
ronmental and climate protection a priority that mir-
rors the constitutional standing it already has and 
underpin it with effective instruments.
 > The German Federal Government and the G20 coun-
tries should work towards ensuring that the new IPCC 
special report on the 1.5°C goal contains a broad 
spectrum of prevention scenarios (with and without 
negative emissions and with and without disruptive 
technological change) to illustrate a balanced rela-
tionship of solutions and highlight both the opportu-
nities and benefits of disruptive change. 
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The governments of the G20 states should campaign not 
only ‘at home’ for innovation, infrastructure, investment 
and inclusion measures, but should also assume a pio-
neering role in climate and sustainability policy at the 
international level, and thereby further transnational 
cooperation and help to find solutions to global prob-
lems. Along with the SDGs, climate protection is cur-
rently the only human undertaking in which all nations 
of the world participate. The achievements of the con-
ference in Paris and the unanimous adoption of the 
Paris Agreement by 196 states shows that multilater-
alism functions very well in the area of climate protec-
tion. Even states such as China or the U.S., which for-
merly had a reputation for impeding progress, contrib-
uted constructively. The 2030 Agenda is also a decidedly 
global project; the system of goals is universal and will 
establish the basis for a diversified global partnership.
As projects for humanity with a long-term focus, cli-
mate protection and the 2030 Agenda constructively 
bring together actors that would not cooperate in other 
contexts or even those that stand in open conflict with 
one another.
It is not a new idea that solving shared sustainabil-
ity and climate policy challenges offers conflicting par-
ties opportunities for rapprochement. At times during 
the Cold War it was championed by Willy Brandt: “The 
solution of mutual problems implies establishing links 
through meaningful cooperation among states […] It 
means building up confidence through practical arrange-
ments. And this confidence may then become the new 
basis for the solution of long-standing problems.” (Willy 
Brandt, upon the occasion of his receiving the Nobel 
Peace Prize in Oslo, 11 December 1971).
If appropriately drafted, sustainability and climate 
policy can become a global project for modernization, 
equity and peace:
 > Prudent climate and sustainability policy serves to 
modernize the global economy and creates opportu-
nities for economic development, as it inspires a new 
understanding of Innovation and creates substantial 
possibilities for Investment and sustainable employ-
ment while channelling investment into future-proof 
industries and business as well as into sustainable 
Infrastructure.
 > Climate and sustainability policy can also be equity 
policy by promoting Inclusion while designing socially 
compatible decarbonization strategies, effectively 
combatting inequalities and strengthening social 
cohesion. 
 > And climate and sustainability policy can contribute 
to preserving peace by deescalating conflicts over 
resources and distribution – thus promoting Inclusion 
at the global level – and thwarting civil wars and mass 
migration.
The suitable arrangement of both the transformation 
towards sustainability and the climate agenda can con-
tribute to solving international crises, particularly the 
blockages preventing innovation and investment, high 
inequality within and between nations – which runs 
contrary to inclusion – and international peace and 
security problems. The G20 should strengthen the Four 
Big ‘I’s of sustainability transformation, engage at the 
international level as pioneers, and help make sustain-
ability and climate policy – which constitute a historic 
project for the global community – a lever for solving 
problems of global policy. In what follows, the WBGU 
presents examples of concrete initiatives that the G20 
could pursue.
4 .1
Climate and sustainability policy as a global 
modernization project
Global economic growth has weakened in recent dec-
ades and global stagnation looms (IMF, 2016). Low 
interest rates and insufficient investments and invest-
ment opportunities are presenting the world economy 
with major challenges, which is altering the economic 
perspective on sustainability questions. As a moderni-
zation project, climate and sustainability policy offers 
much potential for investment possibilities and great 
economic opportunities. At the same time, climate and 
sustainability policy’s long-term and strategic perspec-
tive makes it a guarantor of ecologically stable economic 
development. The G20 should campaign at the global 
level for a new understanding of a social and ecological 
market economy and place a new global understanding 
of innovation on the international agenda as a model for 
a global mission for stability and future viability.
Directed and productive investment
The increasingly prevalent political and societal 
 recognition that early action on climate mitigation 
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helps  minimize costs and risks and forges the path to 
a resilient economy is already creating market adjust-
ments, such as a stronger focus on electromobility by 
car manufacturers and divestment by renowned inves-
tors (Norwegian pension fund, Allianz, etc.).  Moreover, 
the climate mitigation currently underway will limit 
climate risks in the 21st century and beyond, as well 
as reduce the long-term costs and challenges of adapta-
tion (IPCC, 2014c). Early action also creates possibilities 
for a ‘softer’ global structural transformation. The Paris 
Agreement has rendered the strategic reorientation of 
CO2-intensive industries unavoidable. Miscalculations of 
the need for structural economic adaptations heighten 
the risk of abrupt changes, such as sudden insolven-
cies and mass layoffs, which can lead to structural crises 
for entire economic regions. A possible ‘carbon bubble’ 
(Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011; WBGU, 2014a;  Carney, 
2015; ESRB, 2016), i.e. the overvaluation of companies 
that have concessions for global oil, coal and gas extrac-
tion, heightens the risk of abrupt revaluations by the 
financial markets. Economic adaptations undertaken 
today in the spirit of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 
Agenda will lead to greater future stability in the eco-
nomic and financial system.
On the path to a new understanding of innovation
The dominant guiding theme of the G20 has thus far 
been the promotion of growth and innovation. The chal-
lenges faced by transformation necessitate a broader 
understanding of innovation and investment, by which 
far-reaching systemic changes via corresponding tech-
nological innovations will be networked more strongly 
with social, institutional and cultural innovations. This 
involves a new orientation for growth and innovation 
that goes beyond the already developed ‘G20 Blueprint 
on Innovative Growth’ (G20, 2016c); the economic 
capability and alignment of innovations should facil-
itate the implementation of the Paris Agreement and 
2030 Agenda.
The cornerstones of such a new understanding of 
innovation are summarized in Table 4.1-1: 
1. In order to improve the predictability of long-term 
investments in the transformation towards sustain-
ability, there must be a reliable expectation that the 
G20 states take seriously and will implement the 
Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda. The over-
all goal of innovation should no longer exclusively 
be the promotion of national competitiveness per se, 
but rather the furtherance of the common national 
and global good, so that economic capability serves 
the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 
2030 Agenda. To protect the global climate system, 
innovative decarbonization policy should become 
the dominant modernization policy of the 21st cen-
tury. 
2. This goes hand in hand with the extension of private 
interests, investments and goods through embedded 
markets, i.e. societally formed markets that integrate 
economic activity into non-economic institutions 
(Polanyi, 1968; Kay, 2003). A new balance must be 
struck between markets and the state; the radical 
variants of each isolated approach have failed. The 
diversity of steering mechanisms in embedded mar-
kets can strengthen economic resilience and form the 
basis for socio-ecological market economies.
3. The primary focus of innovation is also shifting, from 
technological innovation to a close combination of 
technological innovation with social, institutional or 
cultural innovation, e.g. new forms of institutional 
configurations, new business models or changing 
lifestyles.
4. At the same time, the range of innovation is widen-
ing from rather incremental changes (like new drive 
technologies, new materials, efficiency improve-
ments for renewable energy sources) to disruptive, 
transformative socio-technological innovation. Not 
only does this tap into the disruptive potential of 
certain technologies, such as information and com-
Table 4 .1-1
Dimensions of a new understanding of innovation.
Source: WBGU 
Dimension Thus far In future
Overall goal of innovation National competitiveness The common national and global good: 
economic capability facilitates the implemen-
tation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 
Agenda – innovation for sustainability
Economic goals of innovation Precedence of private interests and 
goods
Embedding of markets and the strengthening 
of public goods
Focus of innovation Technological innovation Technological innovation is coupled to a high 
degree with social, institutional and cultural 
innovation 
Depth and reach of innovation Incremental innovation (within 
 existing socio-economic systems)
Disruptive or systemic innovation (with 
intended or sought systemic change towards 
sustainability; global)
Sources and locations of 
 innovation
Industrial countries as drivers of 
innovation – transfer to the rest of 
the world
Global innovation – strengthened 
 international cooperation for global 
 innovation exchange
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munications technologies, but it also requires a com-
prehensive system transformation. For example, the 
shift to electromobility represents a system inno-
vation that includes vehicles, energy generation 
and storage, infrastructures as well as the entire 
 value-added chain of the automobile sector. 
5. The sources of innovation and the locations of inno-
vation generation in the new understanding of inno-
vation are far more diverse than they are today, 
with industrialized countries’ patterns of innova-
tion transfer still dominating the rest of the world. 
However, social innovation, approaches to securing 
global common goods, approaches to social partic-
ipation and alternative concepts of prosperity are 
already increasingly being generated in emerging 
economies and developing countries (Stamm et al., 
2012). For example, China has now become the lead 
market and most important manufacturer of electric 
vehicles, and Brazil is the global technology leader 
in terms of producing energy from sugar cane. The 
diversity of innovation sources, spanning to include 
parts of society that have not been directly related to 
research in the past, is an appropriate starting point 
for the urgently needed national as well as interna-
tional networking of research programmes on inno-
vation. The G20 states should strengthen interna-
tional cooperation on the promotion of innovation.
4 .2
Climate and sustainability policy as a global equity 
project
In addition to climate change, increasing global socio- 
economic inequality is one of the greatest challenges 
facing sustainable development. The issue of inequality 
has already been addressed by the G20 Hangzhou com-
muniqué (G20, 2016b). The G20 should become even 
more active in finding solutions to global problems of 
 inequality. Climate protection can be an important part 
of the answer; since climate change often has the greatest 
impact on the most vulnerable population groups, effec-
tive climate protection harbours great potential both for 
greater global equity and realization of the SDGs. How-
ever, climate mitigation does not automatically foster 
equity. The WBGU proposes that the G20 states develop 
climate protection measures in such a way that they 
combat poverty and inequality, and thereby link and 
simultaneously address climate protection and equity. 
The G20 states should campaign to give climate protec-
tion an important role in the international agenda as a 
project to promote equity. Together with their cooper-
ation partners, they should develop strategies such as 
those that prioritize investment in areas where climate 
protection also creates inclusive growth – i.e. where the 
40% segment of the population with the lowest incomes 
profits overproportionately (Shared Prosperity Index: 
World Bank, 2015) – or focus on nutritional equity and 
the sustainability of global dietary patterns. Such goals 
should be promoted not least through the activities of 
multilateral banks. The G20 should push for the Green 
Climate Fund, along with institutions like the World 
Bank and regional development banks, to place a par-
ticular focus on financing and implementing measures 
and projects that combine climate mitigation and equity.
Managing urbanization to achieve climate mitigation 
and inclusive growth
Managing urbanization is an important area in which the 
G20 states can combine climate mitigation and inclusive 
growth. Urbanization develops differently in the various 
states of the G20. In some countries, building works in 
mature cities tend to focus on renovation and redevel-
opment, while in other countries cities and settlements 
are rapidly growing to unimaginable dimensions. In con-
sideration of the pending boom in global urbanization, 
the style and method of how cities are built must be 
thought about in a completely new light. This includes, 
for instance, their structural and spatial design, urban 
transport systems, urban energy supply and the build-
ing materials that are used (WBGU, 2016a). At the same 
time, income and wealth inequality are becoming more 
acute in many cities and are leading to spatial segrega-
tion and social disadvantage, which is especially visible 
where there are slums and gated communities in imme-
diate proximity to one another. The growing disparities 
are having an increasingly negative effect on the social 
cohesion of urban societies, urban economic develop-
ment and the governability and safety of cities (WBGU, 
2016a).
If global urban development followed the model in 
industrialized countries, the emissions caused through 
the construction of new infrastructure for the addi-
tional 2.5 billion city-dwellers expected by 2050 would 
alone correspond to one-third of the remaining CO2 bud-
get if climate change is to be limited to 2°C, and more 
than three-quarters of the budget if the 1.5°C target is 
to be met (WBGU, 2016a; Müller et al., 2013). While 
SDG No. 11 (‘Make cities and human settlements inclu-
sive, safe, resilient and sustainable’) has made the theme 
of sustainable urban development part of the 2030 
Agenda, the challenges and opportunities of urbaniza-
tion in the context of the Paris Agreement and in the (I)
NDCs have thus far found little or no consideration. The 
G20 states should address this deficit by making sus-
tainable urban development a core element in national 
and international decarbonization strategies and should 
campaign for greater consideration of the theme within 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Several fields of action within urban development 
offer potential for the coupling of climate mitigation 
and equity, such as land use, the recycling economy 
and renewable energy sources (WBGU, 2016a). Mobil-
ity and transport in particular are of great significance: 
urban transport systems are responsible for a consider-
able share of cities’ CO2 emissions; and their structure 
determines which segments of the population can move 
more easily throughout the city in order to, for instance, 
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participate in the employment market and profit from 
the gains in growth. The configuration of urban trans-
port systems is therefore an important lever for creat-
ing urban equity. Poorer urban population groups suffer 
more than others from the consequences of motorized 
private transport and are disproportionately affected 
by less efficient public transport systems, as they typi-
cally depend on them to a large degree (WHO and UN- 
Habitat, 2010). Functioning public transportation infra-
structure is thus a key element for the eradication of 
urban inequality (UNEP, 2012; UKAID and DFID, 2012; 
Beard et al., 2016). 
The WBGU recommends that the G20 states configure 
their inner-city transport systems as quickly as possible 
to be inclusive and emissions-free (Subgoal ‘accessible 
cities’ of SDG No. 11; WBGU, 2016a: 165 ff.) and, within 
the framework of their international development coop-
eration, join with their partners in forging strategies to 
enable its implementation in their cities. For this to suc-
ceed in light of strong path dependencies, a correspond-
ing course must rapidly be set. The time window for the 
necessary transformation is open now and must be uti-
lized before it closes.
Urban mobility should be designed so that people of 
all income groups can move comfortably and inexpen-
sively through a city in order to profit without restric-
tions from its economic, social and cultural possibilities. 
As poorer population groups tend to suffer most from 
motorized private transport, while benefitting from 
it the least, this requires functioning and well-devel-
oped local public transport as well as good infrastruc-
ture for pedestrians and bicycles. At the same time, 
adequate mobility systems can create positive employ-
ment effects, above all for poorer strata of the popula-
tion. Local public transport should be made accessible to 
everyone, and streets should be made safer for non-mo-
torized traffic (Pro-poor Transport Policies; WBGU, 
2016a: 165 ff.). Above all, the modes of mobility and 
safety needs of vulnerable groups such as the elderly, 
children and women should figure prominently in the 
planning process (Hamilton et al., 2006). 
Nutritional equity and sustainable dietary patterns
The G20 should campaign to strengthen sustainability 
and equity in the context of global dietary patterns. It 
should promote the issue in international discussions, 
work towards placing it on the agenda of international 
organizations, and support it with structural measures. 
The 2030 Agenda also calls to address this issue: SDG 
No. 2 obliges the world community to end world hun-
ger, including malnourishment, and make food produc-
tion sustainable.
From a global perspective, the high share of the 
world’s population suffering from hunger and malnour-
ishment is not attributable to a lack of fertile land, but to 
inefficient production and consumption practices as well 
as inequitable distribution (WBGU, 2011: 63). Accord-
ing to a study by the WWF (2015), one-third of all food 
in Germany is lost on the way from field to consumer or 
is thrown away in households. The global share of pro-
duced food that either spoils, is lost or is thrown away 
is also one-third (FAO, 2011), while an additional third 
is used to feed livestock (de Schutter, 2011). The cattle 
industry uses (directly and indirectly) around 70% of 
all agricultural land (Steinfeld et al., 2006). Its  products 
are predominantly consumed by the populations of 
industrialized countries and the growing middle classes 
of emerging economies, whereby the quickly rising 
consumption of meat is posing increasing health risks 
(McMichael et al., 2007). Today’s intensive agriculture 
is mostly performed in an unsustainable way, and leads 
to land degradation and a loss of biodiversity and eco-
system services. It also accounts for between 10–12% 
of the world’s anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
(IPCC, 2014b: 822). 
The G20 states play a key role with regard to food 
security and nutritional equity. This includes urgently 
needed structural measures such as curbing land deg-
radation, promoting sustainable agriculture and pre-
venting food loss along the value chain (as explained by 
the G20 agriculture ministers in May 2015). In order to 
remain effective, structural measures must be carried out 
through a transformation of food practices of citizens in 
all G20 states. Moreover, it is especially the industrial 
countries and emerging economies that are responsi-
ble for contributing to this transformation through mea-
sures not only structural, but knowledge- and motiva-
tion-based as well. Without responsible citizens, a solu-
tion to this problem is impossible.
The societies of the G20 states face the challenge of 
encouraging sustainable diets, such as those based on 
regional, ecologically farmed foods and on fewer animal 
products, while not encroaching too forcefully on the 
autonomy and self-determination of the citizens, which 
could have a reactionary or backlash effect. Moreover, 
less consumption of animal products would be funda-
mentally healthier for the populations of industrial 
countries and the quickly growing middle classes in 
developing countries and emerging economies (WBGU, 
2011: 65).
Top-down regulatory measures should be coupled 
with improved access to healthy and climate-friendly 
foods. In the sense of collaborative action by both the 
state and citizenry, initiatives and practices should be 
promoted in which people want to perform their roles 
as responsible consumers, e.g. through food sharing. 
These initiatives should be more institutionally bound, 
cooperating, for instance, with international organiza-
tions, educational institutions, employers and authori-
ties. The FAO, for example, should further strengthen its 
food-saving program, ‘SAVE FOOD: Global Initiative on 
Food Loss and Waste Reduction’.
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Climate and sustainability policy as a global peace 
project
Climate and sustainability policy can help maintain peace 
by combatting the causes of civil war and mass flight. As 
early as 2008, the WBGU report ‘Climate Change as a 
Security Risk’ called attention to the fact that climate 
change, in the absence of decisive countermeasures, will 
overstrain the adaptability of many  societies in the com-
ing years (WBGU, 2008). Climate change contributes – 
with regionally varying intensity – to the endanger-
ment of human security, since it jeopardizes the fulfil-
ment of people’s basic needs, exacerbates conflicts over 
resources and distribution, reduces cultural development 
and identity, and contributes to the causes of migration, 
which in turn can cause instability in migrants’ desti-
nation societies (Adger et al., 2014: 758; Oppenheimer 
et al., 2014: 1061). Climate mitigation and adaptation 
measures are therefore important strategies for the pro-
tection of human and societal security.
According to the assessment by the IPCC, climate 
change will increase the future danger of violent con-
flicts between states in certain regions (Adger et al., 
2014: 772). Moreover, climate change will gain impor-
tance with regard to future migration decisions (WBGU, 
2008, 2014). The multiple causes of crises, conflicts and 
migration decisions make data acquisition and prognoses 
more difficult (IDMC, 2015; UNHCR, 2015; Adger et al., 
2014; Oppenheimer et al., 2014). According to assess-
ments by the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), the effects of climate change could create up 
to 200 million migrants by 2050 (IOM, 2009; WBGU, 
2014a: 62 f.). 
The literature refers to human mobility, which can be 
subcategorized into displacement, (predominantly vol-
untary) migration and planned resettlement (UNHCR 
et al., 2014). Neither the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) nor the Paris Agree-
ment explicitly address the issue of climate-induced 
flight (Chapter 1). The terms ‘climate refugee’ and ‘cli-
mate migrant’ have not yet been defined under interna-
tional law (WBGU, 2014a: 62 f.; Brouers, 2012; Nümann, 
2015). The Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC) does not 
protect ‘climate refugees’ (Nümann, 2015), since the cri-
teria according to Article 1 of the GRC (in short, well-
founded fear of persecution on the grounds of certain 
characteristics, such as political conviction) are not ful-
filled by climate-related natural catastrophes or damage 
to the environment (Nümann, 2015: 168). The existing 
international regulations on refugee protection stipu-
late – with overwhelming consensus – no obligation for 
(mandatory) acceptance of ‘climate refugees’ (Brouers, 
2012; Nümann, 2015). Internal migrants as a result of 
natural catastrophes or climate change are recognized 
only by the geographically limited intra-African Kam-
pala Convention and the (non-binding) Guiding Princi-
ples on Internal Displacement.
Changing the GRC looks unpromising due to the con-
siderable amount of political resistance it faces. On one 
hand, an expanded scope for the applicability of the 
Convention on Climate Refugees is seen as undesir-
able by many potential receiving countries; on the other 
hand, there is concern that renewed negotiations of 
existing agreements would lead to an erosion of the cur-
rent system of refugee protection, rather than its expan-
sion. As an alternative to modifying the Geneva Refu-
gee Convention, a protocol to the Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change should be proposed that would 
offer populations in dangerous areas the possibility to 
resettle (Biermann and Boas, 2008).
As a contribution to the security of global peace, the 
G20 states should place climate protection measures on 
the agenda and explore possibilities for intervention. 
These depend on factors of both time and space; slowly 
occurring catastrophes (e.g. desertification) and latent 
conflicts can be addressed differently than sudden 
catastrophes (e.g. floods) and escalating violence. And 
there are big distinctions as to whether people must, can 
or want to migrate, and whether migration (or flight) 
is planned or unplanned, remains domestic or requires 
crossing national borders. The WBGU sees three partic-
ular areas where action is required:
Micro-level: combatting local, climate-induced 
causes of conflict and flight 
In many regions, climate-induced catastrophes and con-
flicts jeopardize the development progress of recent 
decades, threaten human security and exacerbate global 
inequalities. The IPCC report (2014c), the SDGs (No. 13) 
and the Paris Agreement emphasize the urgency of 
adaptation measures and demand their implementation 
in order to combat local climate-induced causes of con-
flict and flight at the micro-level. Especially in regard 
to slowing occurring climate-induced catastrophes, the 
far-reaching socio-economic and political implications 
necessitate the early, proactive and appropriate selec-
tion and suitable implementation of short-, medium- 
and long-term adaptation strategies.
In addition to technical adaptation measures (e.g. 
flood protection, hurricane shelters), social and institu-
tional measures (e.g. risk management) are increasingly 
being promoted (Noble et al., 2014: 836). This requires 
not only a continual integration and expansion of exist-
ing political framework conditions, but also the integra-
tion into and the strengthening of coping strategies for 
the local populations (NRC and IDMC, 2014: 12; Noble 
et al., 2014: 836). Capacity building and financial sup-
port from local actors should find greater resonance in 
the G20’s international climate and development policy, 
and more funding should be earmarked for these areas.
Meso-level: strengthening settlement programmes 
When climate-induced migration is inevitable or 
has already occurred, the central challenge becomes 
strengthening the resilience of the migrated groups and 
the populations in their destination regions. If future 
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migration is unavoidable as a last resort to adapta-
tion, it should take the form of an informed, planned 
and jointly conceived resettlement as far as possible, 
especially in the case of slowly occurring catastrophes 
(Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobil-
ity, 2015). The G20 states should therefore promote the 
expansion as well as the financial security of settlement 
programmes. At the institutional level, consideration for 
this task would be given to the UNHCR and IOM, whose 
institutional capacities in this regard should be strength-
ened. The discussion surrounding an official expan-
sion of the UNHCR’s mandate in this context should 
be taken up again by the G20 (on the mandate: Hall, 
2013). Emergency assistance and medium-term devel-
opment cooperation must be better coordinated. More-
over, structured return programmes should be offered to 
migrants who are able to remigrate to their home coun-
tries. Urban settlement programmes for migrants with-
out this option should be strengthened in order to avoid 
the growth of slums as well as crises and conflicts in the 
destination areas. It is therefore important to reinforce 
multi-actor approaches to the support and cooperation 
of local, regional, national and, in some cases, interna-
tional actors from government and civil society.
Macro-level: putting climate migration on the 
agenda 
The climate agreement reached in Paris should be imple-
mented with urgency in order to use climate mitigation 
and climate adaptation policy to combat the causes of 
flight early on. As mentioned in the coalition agreement 
between the CDU, CSU and SPD (CDU et al., 2013: 125), 
clarifying the status of climate refugees who migrate 
over national borders – while allowing for the option of 
developing an international protection instrument – is 
an international imperative. The WBGU proposes con-
cluding additional protection agreements beyond those 
covering refugee rights. The G20 states should begin this 
discussion and arrange for protection and an equitable 
sharing of costs. Local adaptation as well as migration 
from high-risk areas should be facilitated, e.g. through 
financing within the scope of the Green Climate Fund. In 
this regard, the Nansen Initiative on ‘Disaster- Induced 
Cross-Border Displacement’, founded by Switzerland 
and Norway in 2012, can serve as a model and con-
necting factor. It targets the development of a protec-
tion agenda for climate-induced migration while focus-
sing on international cooperation, the application of 
uniform standards for dealing with refugees, and oper-
ative mechanisms (e.g. financing mechanisms and the 
assumption of responsibility by international humani-
tarian and development actors). The Nansen Initiative 
has launched an international process that ultimately 
aims to achieve political consensus on the protection 
of people displaced across national borders by climate 
change and environmental catastrophes. This process 
should be supported by the G20.
4 .4
Recommendations
With the right configuration, sustainability and climate 
policy can become a global project for modernization, 
equity and peace. The G20 governments should push for 
the Four Big ‘I’s of sustainability transformation and, as 
pioneers at the international level, help make sustain-
ability and climate policy – which constitutes a historic 
project for the global community – a lever for solving 
problems of global policy. The WBGU recommends the 
following actions to the G20 governments:
Climate and sustainability policy as a global 
modernization project – seizing opportunities for 
economic development 
 > Promote an expanded understanding of innovation: 
Focus on the development of new key technologies 
along with social innovations that target the common 
national and international good as well as the provi-
sion of public goods and capital; focus on systematic 
and disruptive innovations that serve the implemen-
tation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda; 
strengthen international cooperation in innovation 
promotion.
Climate protection as a global equity project
 > Shape the development of urbanization to achieve 
climate protection and inclusive growth: Consider sus-
tainable and inclusive urban development while 
developing decarbonization strategies and national 
contributions; strengthen the role of sustainable 
development within the (I)NDCs and the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.
 > Promote nutritional equity and sustainable dietary 
patterns: Combine top-down regulatory measures 
and the improvement of access to healthy and 
 climate-friendly foods with the promotion of 
 bottom-up initiatives and improved institutional 
frameworks; strengthen relevant initiatives of inter-
national organizations.
Climate protection as a global peace project – 
climate protection and human security 
 > Reduce the causes of civil war and mass flight at all 
levels: (1) At the micro-level: reduce local climate- 
induced causes of conflict and flight; (2) At the meso-
level: strengthen settlement programmes; (3) At the 
macro-level: in the allocation of funds, e.g. the Green 
Climate Fund, take into account in situ and ex situ 
adaptation through capacity building in vulnerable 
regions and in migration destinations; reach addi-
tional protection agreements beyond those concern-
ing only refugee rights (e.g. within the UNFCCC) and 
strengthen the Nansen Initiative.
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After the 2015 consensus on Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and global climate goals (Paris  Agreement), 
the focus must now be on implementation. The neces-
sary changes can be described as the Four Big ‘I’s: the 
Great Transformation towards sustainability requires 
and inspires Innovation while channelling Investment 
towards sustainability and climate protection, e.g. 
towards the construction of sustainable Infrastructure. 
At the same time, the transformation can be used to 
combat inequality and promote Inclusion within soci-
eties and globally, thus becoming an equity project. 
The group of the 20 most important industrialized and 
emerging economies (G20) should play a leading role in 
the transformation.
G20 for climate protection
 > During Germany’s G20 presidency, the German fed-
eral government should strive for G20 consensus on a 
decarbonization goal to reduce the G20’s CO2 emis-
sions to zero by 2050. The G20 states should move 
forward with ambitious reduction targets and develop 
decarbonization strategies. Core elements include the 
rapid expansion of renewable energies, an effective 
limiting of energy consumption, a swift phase-out of 
the use of fossil fuels as well as the protection and 
restoration of natural ecosystems.
 > The G20 should position itself critically in terms of 
geoengineering. Measures targeting the manipulation 
of the Earth’s radiation balance should not be pur-
sued. Also, large-scale alterations of the carbon cycle 
should be avoided. Exceptions include the combining 
of bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and  storage 
(BECCS) on a small scale as well as the chemical bind-
ing of CO2 from the air, both of which require addi-
tional research and testing.
Financing a sustainable future 
 > To implement the sustainability and climate goals, the 
G20 states should establish transformative sovereign 
wealth funds, which the WBGU also calls ‘future 
funds’. These should be fed from two sources: (1) the 
pricing of CO2 emissions; this should reach US$ 30 
per tonne by 2020 and double with each successive 
decade; (2) a progressive estate tax as a generational 
component; the revenue goal should be set at 
10–20% of the national inherited or gifted wealth. 
 > The future funds should orient their investment 
strategies towards long-term sustainability and 
climate protection goals and invest in corresponding 
key industries. The dividends should be used to fund 
national social and structural policy in support of the 
transformation. A share of the income derived from 
CO2 taxes and emissions trading should be invested 
directly at the project level, applied to the mobiliza-
tion of private investments and used for international 
climate cooperation.
Climate and sustainability policy as a global 
modernization project
 > The G20 should propagate an expanded understand-
ing of innovation for stability and sustainability in 
harmony with the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. It 
should also be geared towards the social and ecologi-
cal embedding of markets and acknowledge that 
social and institutional innovations are necessary as 
well.
Climate and sustainability policy as a global equity 
project
 > The G20 states should strengthen sustainable urban 
development as well as nutritional equity and 
 sustainable dietary patterns as examples of  furthering 
not only climate protection, but also inclusive growth.
Climate and sustainability policy as a global peace 
project 
 > The G20 states should promote inclusion at a global 
level through combatting local, climate change-in-
duced causes of conflict and migration as well as giv-
ing stronger support to settlement programmes. The 
G20 should initiate solutions for climate change- 
induced migration.
Counteracting nationalism and authoritarian 
movements 
 > A proactive national as well as international sustain-
ability and climate policy would be a G20 project 
suitable to curtail nationalist or authoritarian 
 movements and their rejection of international 
 cooperation.
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